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1Welfare to work policy is central to British reforms of its
welfare state and social security system. We are not alone
in our desire to assist unemployed and other claimants to
find and retain work. It is therefore important to be able to
look to other countries and consider lessons that could be
drawn. Learning from abroad is a difficult and challenging
exercise. While it is tempting to try and take the ‘best’
aspects of foreign policies and to bring them home, it is
often dangerous to do so without a real appreciation of
their context – not only their macro-economic and
ideological foundations – but also their organisational
basis. The core task of welfare to work programmes is to
enable and encourage non-employed claimants of cash
transfer programmes to work or to better prepare them for
employment. The core of this report is a comparison of
British, American, French, German and Dutch practices.
The word ‘welfare’ trips much more easily off the tongue
than ‘non-employed claimants of cash transfer
programmes’ and the phrase ‘welfare to work’ has become
shorthand for a wide variety of approaches and schemes.
It is often the case that a wider usage of a simple phrase
obscures rather than clarifies essential differences in
underlying meaning. The phrase ‘welfare to work’ is an
example of this process. Britain has imported the phrase
from the USA and, alongside other terms such as
‘workfare’ and ‘making work pay’, it has entered the
policy-making vocabulary without a thorough and
ongoing analysis of how far the underlying assumptions
of the American phrase are appropriate. For instance, the
US word ‘welfare’ describes a particular form of cash
assistance for a very narrow target population and yet we
apply it across the board. British usage hides the fact that,
if we now apply our conception of ‘welfare’ abroad, it will
cut across different schemes and target populations in
different countries in ways that do not make sense to each
particular national setting. Indeed, it would not even be
valid when applied in the USA – its original home.
The difference between language and actual policy on the
ground is a real problem for comparison and policy
learning. A major theme of this report is the recognition
that claimant populations are often served by several sets
of policy makers and providers, and sorted between them.
There may be more than one provider of benefit income
and then more again providing services and subsidies that
can move claimants into work. Put simply, how policy
actors define you influences the reality of each part of the
phrase welfare to work. It defines you as a being in a
target programme or as part of a target population – that
is, in the welfare part of the phrase – and also often
determines what you get and from whom in order to work.
It is these differences that I call the ‘the organisation of
opportunity’.
This report approaches policy comparison by first
describing the organisation of the cash transfers that make
up ‘welfare’ in the British sense of the word – cash
transfers to all of working age – and some of the policy
assumptions that accompany them in Chapter 1. A
discussion of activation programmes that aim to help
transition into work is given in Chapter 2 and this is
followed by a comparison of programmes that provide
assistance in work in Chapter 3. This approach thus
unpacks the often-rhetorical phrase welfare to work using
a simple distinction of three elements:
1 welfare: a description of who is in the target group
2 to: a description of activation
3 work: a description of benefits and subsidies provided
for employment, and of the provision of work and
work experience programmes.
Chapters 4 and 5 then discuss experience and best practice
in implementation and co-ordination of welfare to work
programmes, and draw conclusions and some potential
policy lessons for Britain. Greater detail of the report’s
underlying themes and questions is given below for
readers who would like to dip selectively into the different
sections of the report.
There are several important assumptions that readers
should bear in mind. First, the report’s approach is based
on a British point of view looking abroad. There is no
attempt to view things from a context-free, academic
observatory placed in orbit above the mid-Atlantic.
Second, the description of foreign policy practice is based
on actual locations within each country because these
other countries organise policy in more devolved ways
and policies differ accordingly from place to place. The
four foreign cities chosen were New York City, Paris (the
north-western suburb of St Denis especially), Hamburg
and Amsterdam. Evidence was collected from these sites
through visits and interviews with policy actors at all
levels of government, and with private and voluntary
providers and academics. Research involved academic
partners in each of the countries who all gave national
overviews of policies and programmes and assisted
greatly in setting up the ground-level research undertaken
in each city in 1998.
Introduction
2The third assumption is that, while a wide spectrum of
cash benefits for working-age people is covered in each
country, specific early retirement schemes have been
omitted. Such claimants and/or schemes may have
subsequently been reassessed and greater encouragement
to work advocated, but it is rare and most changes to these
schemes reflect concern to reduce inflows rather than
increase outflows into employment. However, early
retirement is a slippery concept in practice and poor
access to such specific schemes often influences the size
and composition of other benefits where proxy early
retirement may occur but under other benefit labels – such
as long-term invalidity benefits in some countries.
Finally, discussion of evidence focuses rather more on the
USA than on the other four countries. This priority
reflects the current state of debate in Britain. We have
heard much about ‘welfare reform’ in the USA and many
of its advocates there are fairly zealous evangelists who
cross the Atlantic with a simple rhetorical language that
seems to strike a chord with many in New Labour. This is
potentially dangerous because British policy is at a
turning point. Our New Deals have been successful in the
most part, but policy makers are keen to expand that
success and bring claimant numbers down – especially for
lone parents and sick and disabled people. Faced with the
apparent ‘success’ of US policy, it is an important time to
emphasise the differences in context and outline some of
the negative American experiences.
Main themes and questions
British policy on welfare to work is dominated by the
way we define our claimants. There is a central strong
and systematic administrative sorting mechanism that
divides the non-working poor into groups – the
unemployed, lone parents, sick and disabled people,
carers and the partners of all these people. These labels
reflect a complex system of rules and entitlements, and
the demarcations of administrative responsibility
between central government departments, between
their executive agencies and even between central and
local government. These divisions have been both
undermined and continued by the New Deals. They
have opened up access to active labour market policy
for many that were previously excluded or ignored.
However, resources have been allocated in a pattern
that continues to exclude or ignore some of the most
pressing needs of those who were previously excluded.
This leads to two simple but important questions that
lie at the heart of this report.
1 Where do we go from here?
2 What can we learn from abroad?
The report takes these two questions and puts them into a
comparative context before describing and analysing
some of the options that appear attractive (and less
attractive) from the four countries.
Chapter 1 is entitled ‘Welfare and national policy maps’
and sets the context in which to understand the ‘who does
what with whom’ questions. Britain is not alone in
dividing up its non-working poor into different claimant
groups administered by differing types and levels of
government and independent policy actors. A prerequisite
for policy learning is to understand ‘where foreign policy
initiatives are coming from’. This means not only the
country of origin but also the organisational interests that
lie behind it and the claimant base it represents.
The central question addressed in Chapter 1 is thus:
• how does the British definition of the target
population for welfare to work programmes compare
with other countries?
Readers will find in Chapter 1 a country-by-country
outline of the different benefits and administrative
structures that match Britain’s concerns for a wide
definition of a ‘welfare to work’ target group. Each
country has a simplified policy map that shows the main
benefits and actors and patterns of decentralisation. At the
end of Chapter 1 is an overview that draws out some of
the lessons from the different national policy descriptions.
Chapter 2 is entitled ‘Activation and economic insertion:
welfare TO work’ and draws together current practices to
help claimants make the transition into work. The
approach taken in Chapter 2 is to bring together policies
across the different claimant and organisational
boundaries by looking at programmes that are:
• redefining the boundaries between claimant groups
and providing co-ordinated administration of benefits
and services
• altering entitlement to benefits: from terminating
entitlement altogether, to making entitlement more
conditional and increasing obligations to compulsory
participation for those who are entitled
• changing the focus of work participation and training
• moving towards a more individual-centred approach
• using third-party intermediaries.
3At the end of Chapter 2, there is an overview that draws
out the apparent important lessons from such approaches.
Chapter 3 is entitled ‘Welfare to WORK: making work
pay, jobs and employment subsidies’ and describes
various themes in in-work support. In a similar approach
to Chapter 2, it focuses on common themes rather than
individual programmes for particular claimant groups.
These themes are:
• employer subsidies
• making work pay through minimum wages and
benefit levels
• making work pay through in-work benefits to the low
paid
• providing work.
Chapter 3 concludes with an overview of in-work support
and apparent lessons for British practice.
Chapter 4, ‘Best practice and lessons for British policy’
brings together evidence from the USA about the effects
of US welfare reform, and then discusses several ways in
which the whole process of welfare to work can be
integrated through mixed packages of assistance on
benefits and in work. These mixed packages draw from
foreign examples of good practice and are outlined with
the following themes:
• induction and assessment of employability
• provision of education and training
• employment and temporary employment
• in-work support.
There is an overview of potential lessons from the US
experience and from these mixed packages of care at the
end of Chapter 4.
Chapter 5 draws together the lessons from the report and
makes some outline policy suggestions for the future of
British welfare to work.
4The UK
New Labour is committed to macro-economic stability in
order to break the cycle of boom and bust that
characterised the 1980s. Fiscal stability with a greater
emphasis on fairness characterises this macro-economic
policy. The inheritance of a strong prolonged recovery
from the 1990–92 recession has meant strong job growth
although mostly in the service sector. However, high
interest rates, now set independently by the Bank of
England, and high exchange rates with Europe have
helped to hold back the manufacturing sector (down 3 per
cent in 1999) with disproportionate effect in the more
industralised regions of the UK.
Employment policy supports entry-level job creation
through promoting flexibility. A higher threshold for
social insurance payments (National Insurance
Contributions) has reduced employers’ tax burden on low-
paid jobs. Specific policies to help the low-paid and
stimulate job growth have increased the generosity and
scope of in-work, means-tested benefits to workers with
children. A minimum wage has also been introduced
without any noticeable effect on job growth. These and
other policies to make work pay are described in detail in
Chapter 3.
Overall, the major difference in employment policy from
the preceding Conservative governments is a greater
emphasis on education and training. This is intended to
raise productivity and reduce educational failure rates that
compare very poorly with European neighbours. A large
expansion of active labour market programmes has sought
to raise the employability of the unemployed as well as to
reduce (and eventually to prevent, it is hoped) long-term
unemployment. Strict fiscal policy has meant that paying
for these so-called New Deal programmes had to come
from a one-off windfall tax on the excess profits of
privatised utilities. These programmes, discussed in
Chapter 2, have a hoped-for, macro-economic feedback
because, by increasing human capital, it is hoped that
higher levels of aggregate employment can be maintained
without inflationary pressure.
Reform of cash transfer programmes has a high profile
under New Labour with major changes to programmes for
children, working-age people and pensioners. The central
Department of Social Security (DSS) is having its
caseload split into three. Child benefits, integrated with
new tax allowances, will pass to the Treasury and Inland
Revenue. Benefits for working-age people will be
administered by a new joint Benefits Agency and
Employment Service, while in-work benefits will be
provided by an expansion of tax credit provision overseen
by the Treasury and Inland Revenue. Pensions (which also
may become integrated with tax credits) will be
administered and overseen by a third agency. At the time
of writing, it is not clear how policy and ministerial
responsibility will be reorganised, and how far the DSS
will maintain an overview on income maintenance matters
or will only remain in charge of pensions. Behind these
fundamental changes in administration are three important
policy themes:
• a major attack on child poverty – where rates are
among the worst in Europe (UNICEF Innocenti
Research Centre, 2000)
• making benefits for working-age people more directly
linked to work and training
• a move away from contributory provision towards
means-testing through the expansion of tax credits
and eventual integration of most benefits and income
tax.
British welfare target groups
Who are the target groups for British active labour
market policies? Assumptions have changed
dramatically in recent years. One central principle of
current welfare reform is ‘Work for those who can;
security for those who cannot’ (DSS, 1998b, p. iii).
This principle excludes pensioners but applies in
theory to a large proportion of all working-age
claimants – whether they are widows, lone parents,
sick and disabled or unemployed. Prior to 1997, the
only claimants put forward for active labour market
programmes were the unemployed. Why has New
Labour widened the target population?
Figure 1 shows the rise and fall of benefit claimant
numbers since 1979 for each boom and trough year of the
economic cycle up to New Labour’s electoral victory in
1997. While the working-age population grew overall by
8 per cent, the numbers of unemployed claimants rose and
fell with the economic cycle but all other claimants grew
across the economic cycle. By 1997, in a period of
sustained economic growth, the numbers of non-
unemployed working-age claimants was greater than the
unemployed as shown in Figure 2.
1␣ ␣ Welfare and national policy maps
5The complex explanations of the growth in lone parent
and long-term sick and disabled claimants are beyond the
scope of this report (see Burchardt, 2000; Evans, 1998;
Walker and Howard, 2000), but the important point for
New Labour’s policy makers is that they believe growth
to be partly as the result of the system itself. First, the
rules of entitlement to benefits as a lone parent or a sick or
disabled person required no obligation to consider work
and gave no access to active labour market programmes.
Second, the division between the work-orientated
unemployed populations and other claimants had been
institutionalised in a division of responsibility between
‘passive’ benefit and active employment organisations. In
policy terms, the DSS has responsibility for all benefits
and income maintenance policy while the Department for
Education and Employment (DfEE) has responsibility for
education, training, and unemployment and employment
policy. Joint policy was limited to the claimant
unemployed. Service provision was divided between the
executive agencies, the Benefits Agency (BA) whose job
it was to assess and make benefit payments and the
Employment Service (ES) who provided public
employment services and services to the unemployed
population. The organisational incentives of these two
providers were largely dictated by the contracts they had
under ‘quasi-market’ arrangements that stipulated
performance measures for the BA to administer benefits
effectively and efficiently, and for the ES to move people
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Figure 2 Composition of British working-age benefit claimant population, 1997
Source: Author’s calculations from DSS (1998a)
6into work and to reduce unemployment. The ES was
rewarded for identifying applicants who didn’t fit the
strict unemployed label and could be referred elsewhere –
primarily to the BA. This encouraged the ES to select and
serve only the unemployed and to refer on those with
child-care or chronic health barriers to employment. There
were no incentives to move the non-unemployed into
work besides the relative generosity of in-work benefits
for those with children. The provision of training for the
unemployed further influenced selection as private
contractors were paid according to completion and
outflow targets often also preferred those with least
barriers to work.
These organisational rigidities were reinforced at the
individual level by rates of benefits that paid more to
those not defined as unemployed. Reform during the
1980s devalued unemployment benefit rates in an attempt
to improve work incentives but in doing so made other
benefits relatively more generous. Until the early 1990s,
contributory long-term sickness benefit remained earnings
related and hence of potentially greater value than both
unemployment benefits (that were in any case duration
limited) and social assistance (Supplementary Benefits up
to 1998 and then Income Support). Differential rates on
social assistance became more rigid after it was recast into
a categorical scheme in 1988.
It is difficult to assess how far such an analysis is correct
in identifying the main causal drivers of increased
claimant caseloads because there are other demographic,
health and economic drivers to be taken into account
(Walker and Howard, 2000). The crucial importance of
these perceived factors was their influence over policy
makers’ assumptions about the role of endogenous causes
for the growth of the welfare population and the need to
widen the scope of welfare to work programmes.
Figure 3 summarises the main institutions and their
responsibilities in British welfare to work and the
claimant groups in a policy map. The role of the local
authorities that assess and pay benefits for rent and rebates
from local property taxes is weak in strategic terms. The
benefits they administer are centrally funded and
controlled. In practice, the local authorities are an extra
level of administration for the majority of benefit claims.
Figure 3 The British policy map of welfare to work
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7The separate assessment of rent and local tax means that
delays and ‘hassle’ are built into the system. It has been
found that the administrative weaknesses of this split
reinforce the reluctance of claimants to enter work
because of the disruption to income flows and budgeting
that can occur.
This policy map is being redrawn. All working-age adults
will become the responsibility of a new unified agency
that is a combination of the BA and ES under a single
policy department. This new arrangement has not been
shown in Figure 3. However, some new unified
administrative arrangements are being piloted through the
ONE service – a single combined operation of ES, DSS
and local authority (LA) services in selected areas and
through the compulsory work-focused interview for lone
parents. In the ONE pilot areas, all inflows onto benefit
are given a single one-stop service and work-orientated
advice and assistance. In the other pilot areas, lone parents
will have to claim from the BA and then attend an
interview at the ES in order to get benefits. These
arrangements are shown in dotted lines and are running
alongside greater overlapping work by the BA and ES on
the various New Deals.
The New Deals
The client group for British welfare to work policy is in
reality defined by the operation of welfare to work
programmes, or New Deals as they have been called.
There are four main new deals.
1 The New Deal for under-25s: this is the result of a
manifesto pledge in the 1997 election that has
promised to move 250,000 young people into work
over the lifetime of the Government. This promise
has now been met. It is a compulsory scheme for all
under-25-year-old unemployed claimants that begins
after six months of unemployment. It consists of a
period of intense personal advice and assistance
followed by one of four options linked to
employment experience and training. Details are
discussed below.
2 The New Deal for Long-term Unemployed
(NDLTU): this is a compulsory scheme for the those
aged 25 and over who are unemployed for over two
years or 12 to 18 months in some pilot areas. It
consists of a period of intensive job reorientation
followed by referral to training or work experience
places.
Both these New Deals target the unemployed claiming
Jobseekers’ Allowance and are thus a refocusing and
intensification of the previous policy concerning the
unemployed. The widening of the client group arises from
the following New Deals, which are currently non-
compulsory.
3 The New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) is targeted at
lone parents whose youngest child is five-and-a-
quarter (i.e. enrolled in primary school) but others can
and have taken it up. It consists of personal advice
and assistance and a limited training budget with
associated child care. NDLP advisors will also staff
the compulsory work-focused interviews operating
for new claimants in some areas – a move that blurs
the non-compulsory nature of the NDLP.
4 The New Deal for Disabled People is targeted at all
working-age disabled or sick claimants and consists
of personal advice and assistance alongside
improving employers’ and other organisations’
perceptions of disabled employment.
There are a further two voluntary New Deals that overlap
with coverage of the others.
5 The New Deal for Partners of Unemployed consists
of personal advice and assistance with work for the
potential second earner in an unemployed household.
This New Deal will become compulsory for partners
under 25 without children.
6 The New Deal for those over 50 consists of personal
advice and assistance with employment and a one-
year in-work subsidy of £60 a week and a training
grant.
Table 1 shows the target caseloads and New Deal
spending plans, and it is obvious just how much of a
priority has been given to the under-25 group relative to
the others. They constitute only 9 per cent of the total
‘welfare’ target group but account for 77 per cent of the
spending. The difference in spending reflects (a) take up
and (b) the costs of intervention. Because take up is
compulsory for the unemployed group, there is a
corresponding depth in provision that is discussed in
Chapter 3, but it is not clear why the difference between
young and old unemployed is necessarily so stark.
However, the low relative spending on the non-
unemployed is partly because they are only given personal
advice and assistance. In addition, because take up is
voluntary, there is less coverage. The major problems with
this approach concern equity. First, there is an inbuilt
gender bias in resources away from women (Rake, 2000).
Second, it does not target most help on those with the
greatest barriers to work. Last, it kicks the issue of better
8quality benefits for those who cannot work, i.e. ‘security
for those who can’t’, into touch. These are problems for
the future that are returned to at the end of the report.
Returning to the phrase ‘welfare to work’, this means that
the ‘welfare’ target population in Britain was around 4.3
million claimants in 1997 and 220,000 of their partners –
together, around one-sixth of the 16–59 population. (This
is ignoring those unemployed claimants who claim for
shorter periods and do not have access to the New Deals.)
How does this ‘welfare’ target group and its organisational
assumptions compare with the other countries? One
problem of pursuing that question is that the word
‘welfare’ has specific and different meanings elsewhere.
In its place, a more neutral term, ‘claimant reservoir’, is
used to refer to claimant populations in other countries
that reflect the British approach. This means crossing
boundaries between insurance and assistance benefits that
are traditionally kept separate, and of bringing lone
parents and sick and disabled people into the arena of
active labour market policy.
The USA
American employment levels have benefited over the past
nine years from an unprecedented period of sustained
economic growth, which has been at the annual rate of 4
per cent for the past four years. Underlying this growth is
continuing growth in labour productivity as well as
declining unemployment levels. The boom has reached
down further than in the 1980s and unemployment is at a
30-year low. Unemployment has fallen in African
American and Hispanic populations but is still twice as
high and 50 per cent higher than the overall rate
respectively. The current boom has seen real incomes rise
across a wide spectrum of the workforce and the high US
income inequality rates have stabilised somewhat rather
than continuing to rise. Official poverty rates have fallen
to 12.7 per cent of the population in 1998 but were 26.1
per cent for African Americans and 33.1 per cent for
female-headed households.
Policy making in the 1990s was dominated by a left of
centre Presidency under Clinton and a right of centre
Congress with a Republican majority. This has led in part
to a dualism in policy where Federally controlled
programmes such as the Minimum Wage and Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC) have expanded while there has
been a retrenchment in what the USA calls ‘Welfare’.
‘Welfare’ in American terminology refers to the means-
tested programmes of public assistance, primarily the joint
Federal–State run programmes for families with children
– formerly Aid for Dependent Families with Children
(AFDC), which was fundamentally reformed in 1996
under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) and replaced by
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). More
details about the design and effects of PRWORA are
covered below and in Chapters 2 and 3. Welfare also
refers to State-run General Assistance programmes but
these now only exist for able-bodied adults without
children in 13 States. The important aspect of Welfare in
the US context is that it is a very small part of the overall
system of income maintenance – around 3 per cent of US
social welfare spending (Gilens, 1999, Figure 1.1). It is
also highly stigmatised: ‘welfare’ is often a derogatory
word. Some on the Right try to widen the meaning to
encompass Federal means-tested programmes such as
Table 1␣ ␣ Original spending priorities of the British New Deals
Target caseload 1997 Spending
£ million
Budget
New Deal Million % of total 1997–2002 % of budget £ per capita
Under-25s 0.4 9 2,620 77 6,550
Over-25s 0.5 11 50 2 100
Lone parents 0.5 12 190 6 380
Disabled 0.9 20 200 6 222
Partners* 0.22 5 60 2 273
Over-50s* 2.0 44 270 8 135
Total 4.52 100 3,390 100 £580
Source: Author’s calculations from Table 2.1 in Hales et al. (2000).
* Some potential overlap between populations.
9Food Stamps and Supplementary Security Income (SSI)
but these benefits are paid to a larger population including
the elderly and disabled and are not commonly associated
with welfare. Cash assistance to working-age people who
are wrongly assumed by the general population to be
predominantly urban blacks is politically unpopular. The
large role of racial prejudice in the negative American
attitude to welfare is an important if under-recognised
characteristic of the US policy environment (Gilens, 1999;
Lieberman, 1998).
The US Right’s criticism since the 1980s argued that
welfare fostered dependency, created an underclass and
should be scrapped (Murray, 1984), or that it amplified
and sustained a culture of dysfunctional family and work
behaviour that required strict paternalistic intervention by
administrators in order to ensure optimal outcomes
(Mead, 1992). Such views are strongly contrasted by the
popular appeal of Social Security provision for pensions
and disability, and for Unemployment Insurance.
Welfare reform in the US has thus been highly politicised
with little consensual basis. The PRWORA changes were
dominated by Republican Congress but were eventually
agreed by Clinton (Weaver, 2000). This compromise has
led to a consensus on the perceived wisdom in
Washington on how to present its effects. This has
emphasised caseload reduction, 52 per cent over Clinton’s
presidency and 43 per cent since PROWRA was
introduced up to December 1999 (DHHS, 2000). The
other emphasis has been the increased work participation
of single female-headed households. These results
allowed both Congress and Clinton to gain political
credibility, but have also further reduced the political
importance and legitimacy of the losers from welfare
reform if they are not working and are no longer on
welfare.
Lower welfare rolls and the rising rate of lone parents in
work have, however, changed attitudes to the working
poor and, more marginally, to those who remain on
welfare – the so-called ‘hard to serve’ – the smaller
welfare populations who have to comply with stricter
work conditions and are gradually being offered a more
service-intensive programme, funded by the huge
windfalls that States have gained from falling rolls. For
those who are in work, who have been shown often to
face significant economic hardship and to have poor
income progression, a new emphasis is emerging to
ensure in-work benefits are delivered effectively, on child-
care provision, and on training and workforce
development.
Returning to Federal policy, Clinton increased the
minimum wage significantly and also expanded the
Earned Income Tax Credit scheme in a number of changes
to eligibility levels and criteria, making it far more
generous as a central plank of ‘making work pay’. Health
care is a major continuing problem in the USA and the
failure to reform coverage and access has meant that the
number of uninsured rose between 1996 and 1998 to
represent 16 per cent of the population (Campbell, 1999),
and is particularly acute for low-income households,
including welfare leavers. Medicaid coverage designed for
the poor has fallen by a million between 1996 and 1998,
and may be linked to welfare reform and changed
administrative practices by the States (Meyers, 2000).
US claimant reservoir
The first point that strikes a British-based comparison is
that contributory social insurance is still a fundamental
and important part of American coverage for
unemployment and sickness. Unemployment Insurance
(UI) is a joint State–Federal scheme with State-set rules
for contribution and eligibility. UI provides earnings-
related benefits – typically between 50 and 70 per cent of
previous net earnings, but limited to a maximum duration
of 26 weeks. UI covers only around 35 per cent of the
unemployed, but there is substantial State-wide variation
– from around 25 per cent in 11 states (mostly Southern
and Rocky Mountain states) to 50 per cent (typically in
the North East and Pacific coast) (Vroman, 1998). Taking
New York State as an example, approximately 39 per cent
of unemployed have coverage. In order to claim, they
must have had earnings above a threshold of $80 per week
and a work history of either 20 weeks in the past 52, or 15
weeks in the past 52, but then a further 40 weeks in the
past 104. States administer UI. Training benefits are also
available for UI claimants who fulfil several conditions.
First, the training must upgrade individual skills to
increase likelihood of future employment. This is focused
on skill needs from changes in the demand side of the
labour market, such as technological change, and seasonal
opportunities, but can also be linked to individual factors
such as personal handicap. (Amstutz et al., 1995).
Contributory social security is the main source of benefits
for old age and disability and is run federally by the Social
Security Administration (SSA). These core social security
benefits are politically popular and, to date, have
remained largely uncut during Reagan’s and subsequent
programmes of retrenchment. There are five major
categories of benefits paid for through in-work Social
Security taxes: retirement, disability, family benefits,
survivors and Medicare. Full retirement benefits are
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payable at age 65 (with reduced benefits available as early
as 62). Disability benefits are payable at any age to people
who have enough Social Security credits and who have a
severe physical or mental impairment that is expected to
prevent them from doing ‘substantial’ work for a year or
more, or who have a fatal condition/illness. The disability
programme includes incentives to smooth the transition
back into the workforce, including continuation of
benefits and health-care coverage while a person attempts
to work, which are mostly absent in the UK. While
administration of Social Security is through local offices
of Federal government, rehabilitation of disabled people is
the responsibility of State government.
There is no National Health Service. Health-care
provision in the USA is primarily through private
insurance: mainly through employer-based health benefit
schemes, but Medicare provides a contributory second tier
to the system linked to social insurance. Medicare comes
in two parts: hospital insurance (sometimes called Part A)
and medical insurance (sometimes called Part B). Those
aged over 65 who are getting Social Security
automatically qualify for Medicare, while those aged
under 65 qualify only if they have been getting
contributory disability benefits for two years or if they
have Survivors Insurance.
The remainder of the US income maintenance
programmes are means-tested schemes. Means-tested
Medicaid is the third-tier health-care safety net (alongside
publicly funded hospitals). Medicaid is a joint Federal–
State programme with specific proportions of State costs
covered by Federal grants. Medicaid covers the poorest
populations with no private or contributory health care
and is given to those on Public Assistance rolls but has to
be a stipulated part of their claim for support. The
problem for US health care is that many fall out of or fall
between public and private coverage, and this is especially
so for low earners. A Child Health Insurance Programme
(CHIP) has been implemented between Federal and State
governments to ensure that children continue to be
covered – States can introduce their own scheme and/or
extend Medicaid coverage.
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) is a Federal
programme run by the SSA that provides means-tested
monthly payments to the uninsured elderly (aged 65 or
over) and younger disabled people including children. The
Federal government pays a basic rate and some States add
money to that amount if they consider it too low. Local
offices of the Federal Social Security Department
administer SSI. Claimants also qualify for Medicaid. SSI
benefits are financed by general tax revenues and are not
paid from Social Security trust funds.
Food Stamps are means-tested vouchers (now being
replaced by electronic payment cards) to purchase food.
They are funded through the Federal Department of
Agriculture, but are administered by local State welfare
agencies. In New York, this is the Human Resources
Administration (HRA). Able-bodied people between the
ages of 18 and 60 without children must work to qualify.
The income test is more generous for pensioners and the
disabled, but all other claimants should have income
below 130 per cent of the Federal Poverty Line (FPL).
Food Stamps are automatically awarded if the household
gets SSI payments or TANF/AFDC. They have played a
significant and growing element in safety-net incomes for
the poorest because their real value has been maintained
more consistently than levels of public assistance benefits,
which have also fallen greatly in their coverage.
A further major difference between Britain and the USA is
that there is no comprehensive social assistance safety net
in America that matches British Income Support and
means-tested Jobseekers’ Allowance. The only safety-net
benefit available in all States is TANF for families with
children, which is the centre of welfare reform. Otherwise,
public assistance safety nets are the sole responsibility of
the States – or even local County governments. These
schemes, called General Assistance (GA), can provide
cash or in-kind benefits, but only in 13 States are there
such programmes for able-bodied people without children.
New York has a General Assistance scheme called Safety
Net Assistance that covers able-bodied adults. It is wholly
funded by State and City funds and is only paid as a cash
benefit for two years. Any longer-term claimants are paid
by way of vouchers – to their landlords for rent, to the
utilities. This method is also used for all drug
rehabilitation cases and will be used in the future for
TANF cases that go beyond their time limit (see below).
New York City’s GA scheme is also highly stigmatised
and carries with it an obligation to work for benefits –
workfare – which is described in more detail in Chapter 3.
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
This is the programme that most US commentators call
‘welfare’, and its claimants are the ‘welfare’ in US
‘welfare to work’ programmes. It is paid to families with
children and lone parents represent the vast majority of its
caseload. From 1996, Federal control over rules and
administration of benefits has been largely waived. In its
place is a Federal funding system that pays States a block
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grant budget based on 1994 caseloads, but that also
rewards and penalises States for meeting specified targets
on work participation and other behavioural matters, and
on continued payment of State funds for analogous
purposes (the so-called maintenance of effort rules). The
law ends central rules governing entitlement to benefits,
leaving States to decide whom to pay benefit to and on
what conditions. However, no Federal funds will be given
to cases who have received benefits for more than 60
months in their lifetime and reduced funds will be given for
each case that fails work participation targets. This means
that time limits exist in all states and many have chosen
limits of less than 60 months (discussed in Chapter 2).
TANF benefits are only payable to families with children
(continuing the AFDC target population). Children are
usually those under the age of 18 but can also be 19 if
they are still at school. New York State has adopted the
Federal lifetime entitlement limit of 60 months for all
cases (other States have enacted shorter maximum
entitlements discussed in Chapter 2). All States may
exempt up to 20 per cent of their caseload from this limit.
However, those cases that fall out of entitlement may be
entitled to the New York State Safety Net Assistance
scheme discussed below. Other Federal rules state that
school-aged parents must both attend High School and
live in the parental home (or have an equivalent domestic
arrangement) as a condition of benefit. The 1996 changes
have also withdrawn entitlement from many legal
immigrants and from most drug felons.
The TANF Federal grants to States have produced a windfall
because caseloads have fallen sharply from the 1994 levels
that determine subsidy. This has increased resources
available to support claimants with such things as child care,
to pay benefits while they work and to provide a more
service-rich regime to the hardest-to-help claimants who
remain on benefits. The relationship between Federal and
State-based funds is complex, but States have been able to
switch previously locally funded programmes to Federal
funds while at the same time maintaining 80 per cent of their
own 1994 spending levels. There has been some redirection
of funds to a slightly wider population – for instance, low-
paid families with children.
The devolution of powers to States to set their own
eligibility criteria for TANF benefits was accompanied by
Federal rules prohibiting legal test cases on the new
welfare arrangements by publicly funded community
lawyers. This has meant that the implementation and
administration of welfare reform has not been subject to
legal scrutiny on behalf of applicants and recipients.
The implementation of TANF reforms has largely been
carried out according to ‘work-first’ principles that have
emphasised looking for and finding work over education
or training. However, the implementation of these
principles differs widely on the ground and is discussed in
Chapter 2.
The US policy map
The organisation of benefits in the US differs greatly from
the centralised national programmes in the UK. There are
more policy players at more levels of government with a
less comprehensive coverage. Figure 4 shows how all the
benefits for the working-age population fit alongside each
other in a view of the US claimant reservoir that coincides
with the British view of welfare to work.
Figure 4 shows the relationship between Federal and State
level responsibilities in a very simplified way – the pure
Federal programmes, such as those run by the SSA, are
completely above the dividing dotted line while the
majority of programmes have some element of joint
funding. The pure State-funded General Assistance is the
only programme completely below the dotted line. The
extent of joint funding varies; for instance, States only
contribute to Food Stamp administrative costs. The policy
map also includes the parallel programmes of
Employment Services and Training programmes run by
the States’ Labor or Workforce Development Departments
under Federal guidance. These are separate in the main
from welfare and from welfare to work programmes that
have tended to develop their own employment and job-
brokering services. However, there is a move to develop
integrated one-stop provision of unemployment,
employment and training services. There are some
instances where States have integrated their welfare-based
employment services in some regard but they are few.
The role of the State Welfare services as deliverers of
State and Federal programmes is emphasised in the
policy map. The Medicaid and Food Stamp
programmes that go fairly automatically to the
population claiming TANF and GA also go to low-paid
workers. The delivery of such programmes to support
transition from welfare into work is thus an important
part of making work pay. One structural weakness of
the US system is how welfare agencies deliver these
in-work benefits. TANF reform has emphasised
changing the culture of welfare administration away
from passive entitlement and towards work, and, as a
result, the delivery of Food Stamps and Medicaid
alongside the new regime has required renewed
attention.
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France
French welfare and employment programmes have been
constrained since the 1980s by macro-economic targets
for maintaining exchange rates and, subsequently,
European Monetary Union membership. The French
determination to be at the heart of Europe is part of a
strong national identity, which also holds that all French
citizens belong to and participate in civic culture and
should not be excluded. These ideas cross the political left
and right such as the current political cohabitation
between the Gaullist President, Jaques Chirac, and the
Socialist Government led by Prime Minister Lionel
Jospin.
But the fact remains that economic exclusion in France is
very high. The OECD estimates an underlying structural
10 per cent rate for French unemployment. This creates an
‘insider–outsider’ problem that in part explains the French
commitment to overcome social exclusion. At the core of
the problem is the labour market where the employed
insiders enjoy strong social security and labour law
protection while outsiders – in particular the young
unemployed – have been faced with both poor social
security coverage and low levels of private job creation.
The French policy response has been slowly to change
structural impediments to job creation and to engage in
large-scale subsidised employment creation – particularly
for youth. The creation of work experience programmes
has been a long-standing element of French active labour
market policy with the majority of such job placements in
the public and voluntary sector. These programmes were
expanded in 1997 by the creation of a new wave of
longer-term quasi-public jobs for young people.
Contributory social security is the central funding
mechanism for both health care and benefit provision and
means that the tax burden falls heavily on employment.
The tax base was widened in the 1990s by introducing the
CSG (Contribution Sociale Généralisée) a non-
contributory additional tax on all incomes, and this has
begun to reduce non-wage costs for employers. However,
France has widely used employer exemptions and rebates
from social security payments – further discussion of this
is in Chapter 3.
The most radical element of French job creation is the
move to shorten working time and to share the fixed
amount of work more widely. The idea is to set up a
virtuous circle of working-time reduction and job
creation, and at the same time promote greater flexibility
to ensure productivity gains and wage moderation. In the
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early 1990s, two voluntary attempts were made to
encourage employers and workers to agree to reduce
working time and few occurred. In 1997, a new statutory
scheme was introduced that gave a timetable for
employers and workers to negotiate changes in working
hours to reduce them on average to 35 hours per week.
The theoretical and practical advantages of this approach
are disputed and it is too early to form a firm impression
of the success of this initiative. Modelling of the approach
as a job creation measure has shown how sensitive it is to
core assumptions about the behaviour of employers and
employees – the impact could be as great as a 5 per cent
increase in jobs or as low as a 0.4 per cent reduction
(OECD, 1999c).
French claimant reservoir
The core of unemployment provision is contributory
unemployment insurance (Assurance chômage).
Claimants must have previously paid contributions for at
least 122 days during the eight months before they lost
their job. Benefit entitlement differs in potential duration
according to contributory record. Additionally, the
earnings-related benefit decreases as unemployment
continues – Allocation Unique Dégressive (AUD). Thus,
the original earnings-related amount of benefit is stable
for a certain time (between three and 27 months) and then,
if entitlement continues, it reduces every six months until
it reaches a minimum rate of payment. Entitlement is
never unlimited but can be effectively extended into early
retirement for the oldest claimants with the longest
contributory history. Those with the shortest working
histories lose entitlement most quickly.
Benefits are administered by local ASSEDIC
(Associations pour l’Emploi dans les Industries et le
Commerce) offices, which represent the joint union and
employer organisation that finances the benefit. All
unemployed must also register at the public employment
service Agence National pour Emploi (ANPE) office
every month. Any interview and job proposed by the
ANPE must be explored – as long as the wage is not more
than 30 per cent less than the previous job – including
temporary and other forms of flexible contract. These
rules have been enforced with increasing severity in
recent years, especially for the younger unemployed.
People over the age of 57 do not have to sign on.
There is a specific unemployment assistance scheme for
some of those whose entitlement to contributory benefit
ends but not for those who do not qualify in the first
instance. Allocation de Solidarité Spécifique (ASS) is
administered by ASSEDIC and is part of what the French
term the solidarity system – state-financed provision to
supplement contributory unemployment benefits but run
by the independent social insurance organisation. ASS is
means-tested but once received continues indefinitely.
However, entitlement to ASS is limited to those who
exhaust their contributory benefits who have worked at
least five years during the last ten years – only one-third
of those who exhaust AUD entitlement. There is, thus, a
huge ‘hole’ in provision for those with weaker
employment histories and younger workers. Part of this
hole is filled by Revenu Minimum d’Insertion (RMI),
which is discussed below.
Sickness and invalidity benefits are part of a separate and
independent system of social insurance for health-care and
sickness benefits. The Caisse Nationale Assurance
Maladie (CNAM) provides both income benefits and
health-care services. There are separate provisions for
some white-collar management cadres, civil servants and
various occupations and industrial sectors, which cannot
be covered here. To qualify for sickness benefit under the
main provisions (so called Régime Generale), there must
be both a contribution record and medically endorsed
illness that either prevents work or reduces earning
capacity by 66 per cent or more. The ‘short-term’ benefits,
Indemnités Journalières, are paid for a maximum of three
years after which long-term Pension Invalidité is paid.
Benefits are 30 per cent of previous earnings unless there
is total incapacity to work, which is paid at 50 per cent.
The dominance of separately funded, independent social
insurance schemes leads to significant gaps in coverage
and France has no comprehensive central or local social
assistance scheme. In its place is a range of categorical
means-tested social minima that are directly attached to
specific insurance provision – as in ASS described above
and minimum pensions (Minimum Vieillesse) – or that
stand in their own right. These self-standing social
minima are administered through the family allowance
fund (Caisse Nationale d’Allocations Familiales –
CNAF). For instance, people with severe disablement that
does not result from work can claim Allocation Adulte
Handicapé (AAH). But the two most important benefits
for this analysis are the scheme for lone parents,
Allocation Parent Isolé (API) and the non-categorical
Revenu Minimum d’Insertion (RMI).
API is paid to pregnant women and parents without a
partner. It is time-limited either to 12 months in total or
until the youngest child reaches the age of three, at which
age they can attend Écoles Maternelles, the universal
nursery schools.
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RMI was introduced in 1989 to cover a large volume of
unmet need for basic income maintenance. Too many
previously fell out of or fell between the specific schemes
in the categorical social insurance system and ended up
not covered by the categorical social minima. Such social
exclusion was not just from income maintenance but also
from health and housing, as well from the labour market
and from social and familial networks. RMI is therefore
more than just an income maintenance scheme. It seeks to
reintegrate the individual back into the systems of support
that stem from a job, social and community relations and
the French welfare system. But, even with this wider
emphasis, providing a minimum income is its main job
and is central to making ‘inclusion’ a reality.
Nobody under the age of 25 may claim RMI unless they
are a lone parent. There is a strong and growing aim to
ensure claimants move into work but the original policy
discussions of RMI stressed both economic and social
reintegration (Paugam, 1993). Claimants enter into a
contract that stipulates what actions they should take as
part of their conditions of receiving benefit. However,
when it comes to participation in formal active labour
market programmes, these contrats d’insertion often have
to be delayed while places become available. The RMI
caseload includes many with chronic ill health, and social
integration where necessary is often pursued before work.
The French policy map
Figure 5 shows the organisational basis for the French
claimant reservoir. Unlike the US, there is little local
government administration involved. The main benefits
for unemployment and sickness are delivered by
functionally specific social security organisations that are
mostly independent of government. The public
employment service is directly involved in job search and
brokering for the unemployed claimants of AUD and
ASS. It also provides services for RMI claimants who are
referred to it.
The administration of RMI is complicated. It is run locally
from central funds and overseen by a regional committee,
Conseil Départemental d’Insertion (CDI), of around 40
members, including local representatives, civil servants
and non-governmental organisation (NGO) delegates
operating at the Departmental level. This council meets at
least twice a year, elaborates a Departmental insertion
programme and sets up an independent evaluation
organisation. Since 1992, 700 decentralised local agencies
– Commissions Locales d’Insertion (CLI) – have also
been set up in order to promote easier access to the
system. The President of the Conseil Général
(Departmental assembly) and the ‘Préfet’ (State highest
civil servant at Departmental scale) together manage RMI
benefit services. The central State is responsible for
Figure 5 The French policy map
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employment, training, housing, health and emergency care
services. Departmental responsibility is free medical aid,
the treatment of alcoholism and drugs problems, and
social services for mothers and children.
On the ground, services are provided by three types of
organisation: local services linked to the town hall
(Mairie) or Centres Communal d’Action Sociale, national-
level state services run by the Department (Services
Départemental d’Action Sociale), and approved non-
governmental organisations. Normal social security access
points are not included because it is one of the
characteristics of the RMI population that they have no
need to go to ASSEDIC offices, etc. However, RMIstes do
get concessionary rights to Sécurité Sociale services –
especially health care. This access is essential because a
high proportion of RMIstes have long-term health problems.
Germany
Germany, like the USA, has a strong federal structure in
which the decentralised regions, Länder, legislate and
implement wide areas of social policy. Additionally,
Germany’s constitution empowers individual and
collective rights and decentralised decision making. This
safeguard against abuse of central authority means that a
wide range of rights is protected by active judicial review
that intervenes in social and employment policy. For
instance, the tax system was found to be unconstitutional
because it failed to ensure a social minimum, and plant-
level working agreements have been found illegal where
they did not meet the collectively agreed standards. Both
collective and individual rights enshrined in social
security and employment policy are often welded into the
structural frame of German policy.
The post-war German social state was always for all
Germans and reunification in 1990 was a political
imperative but has had huge fiscal and macro-economic
consequences. The old East was bankrupt, industrially
undercapitalised, overmanned and inefficient. West
German social and economic policy incorporated its
prodigal other half. The high hidden unemployment,
inadequate social benefit rates and other characteristics of
the old soviet-style welfare state became subject to the
German social state.
The costs of unification led to real difficulties in
maintaining the normal German practice of fiscal
prudence and interest rates were raised pushing Germany
into recession in the early 1990s. Job creation was also
affected as some of the costs of unification were met by
an increase in social security contributions – social tax –
which raised already high non-labour costs. The
combination of generous earnings-related unemployment
benefits (with means-tested extensions of unlimited
duration), high payroll social insurance taxes and strong
institutionalised collective bargaining (there is no national
minimum wage in Germany but sectoral and industry-
wide agreements) meant that underlying structural
unemployment is high (OECD, 1999a).
Unemployment became the dominant domestic political
issue of the mid-1990s. The Kohl government promised to
halve unemployment, failed and was defeated in
September 1998 by a left of centre coalition of Social
Democrats and Greens. Kohl’s employment policy had
restricted eligibility to unemployment benefit and
enforced job search, had weakened employment
protection in small firms and had introduced new
temporary fixed-term work contracts, while a range of
employer subsidies to take on the unemployed had not
been popular.
The new Schröder government kept Kohl’s subsidies and
job promotion elements of employment policy but
revoked the higher obligations to job search and the
weakening of employment protection in small firms. It
then set out to attempt a new national agreement on
training and jobs between unions and employers. This
involves new vocational and training places and a job
creation scheme for young unemployed. Meanwhile, an
Alliance for Jobs has been set up for the unions and
employers to find ways of increasing part-time and
flexible work, lowering non-wage costs, modernising the
vocational apprenticeship scheme and improving job
creation for the less skilled.
The German claimant reservoir
Social insurance lies at the heart of German social
welfare. Federally run employment and unemployment
insurance are administered by the Bundesanstalt für
Arbeit (BA). Unemployment insurance is paid for from in-
work contributions of 6.5 per cent of full-time gross
earnings with no upper limit (employers pay an additional
6.5 per cent making a total of 13 per cent).
Arbeitslosengeld (ALG) is a contributory earnings-related
unemployment benefit that has a duration that varies
according to age and contributory history. There is no
minimum level of benefit but it is paid at two rates: a
basic rate of 60 per cent of net earnings and a higher rate
of 67 per cent for those with children. Claims for benefit
are made through the local Federal Labour Office, the
Arbeitsamt, which is also the public employment service.
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Unemployment insurance can be extended by means-
tested unemployment assistance, Arbeitslosenhilfe (ALH),
which is also run by the BA. It also is earnings related but
is paid at lower rates than contributory benefits – 53 per
cent without children and 57 per cent with children. For
those who claim when they exhaust contributory
coverage, there are no additional contributory rules and
ALH will last for 12-month periods that can be repeated
indefinitely (up to pension age). For others to qualify, they
must have contributions from 150 days’ full-time work in
the past year and entitlement is limited to one year only.
Claimants are still required to attend and register at the
Arbeitsamt.1
Social insurance for health-care and sickness benefits is in
schemes separate and independent from unemployment
benefits. Employers and employees contribute to funds
(Krankenkassen) in which employers and trades unions
are equally represented. Sickness benefits (Krankengeld)
are paid for those who have been sick for more than six
weeks – the statutory period for employer-paid sick pay.
Krankengeld is earnings related – based on 80 per cent of
previous earnings – and is payable for a maximum period
of one-and-a-half years (78 weeks) in any three years.
Longer-term and permanent invalidity is covered by
schemes that either pay a full pension for those who are
completely unable to work or a part pension for those with
reduced earning capacity. This latter group has access to
occupational rehabilitation services and retraining through
the PES (public employment service).
Social Assistance (Sozialhilfe) is a comprehensive means-
tested social safety net run by regional and municipal
government along federally set rules. It provides both
minimum incomes and a means-tested system of welfare
and health provision. The minimum income benefit is
called Hilfe zum Lebensunterhalt (HLU). The Länder
(federal regions) set rates for HLU according to nationally
determined principles and equivalence scales. HLU
benefits can be tailored to meet individual needs through
discretionary allowances. The guiding principles of
Sozialhilfe are that it provides a constitutional guarantee
against destitution but that this must be below available
income from earnings. It is highly stigmatised and is run
by social welfare departments of municipalities. Parents
and children can be legally held as responsible for
maintenance for each other beyond the age of majority.
The conditions for claiming HLU are subject to local
discretion and constitutional interpretation. The growth in
numbers of unemployed people relying on Sozialhilfe has
been a policy challenge to the local authorities because of
the growing cost of uninsured unemployment that they
have to meet when they consider employment policy to be
primarily a Federal issue. In the past few years, there have
been moves to reorganise and reassess the costs and
coverage of the unemployed to respond to this dilemma
but no significant policy changes have been agreed.
Municipal authorities have powers to run public
employment programmes for Sozialhilfe claimants. Such
Hilfe zum Arbeit schemes had until recently been
interpreted as rehabilitative work in municipal services
such as gardening, clerical and administrative work
(Breuer, 1999). However, new temporary employment and
training programmes have begun to expand into more
structured welfare to work strategies.
The German policy map
Figure 6 shows the German institutions and their
responsibilities. The divide between Federally run
employment policy and locally run social assistance
policy characterises the institutional basis of German
welfare to work. Contributory unemployment benefits and
employment services are the responsibility of the Federal
Institute for Employment (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit) in
Nuremberg. The benefit provisions exist alongside the
other programmes of the Employment Promotion Act –
the Arbeitsfoerderungsgesetz (AFG). At the Federal level,
passive and active programmes are aligned. Benefits for
the unemployed include special provisions for seasonal
unemployment in the construction industry, and short-time
working. The main organisational divide in Federal policy
is between the social insurance schemes for
unemployment and health. The overlap between sickness
and unemployment is not always a smooth one.
Claimants who are able to return to work after a period of
sickness are able to claim unemployment benefits.
Bolderson et al. (1997) have noted the inherent
institutional ‘trade barriers’ between the different funds
and responsibilities, between insured invalidity and
unemployment, and between insured and uninsured risks.
The difficulties of categorising people as either
incapacitated or long-term unemployed, as
employable and therefore recipients of
unemployment benefits or ‘unemployable’ requiring
social assistance, etc. are especially visible in the
German arrangements … There are incentives for
not accepting claims or for moving beneficiaries on,
and these are likely to have effect in the ‘mixed1Arbeitslosenhilfe is an earnings-related benefit – a hybrid between
insurance and assistance provision.
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contingency’ cases... [and] can also result in
‘passing the parcel’ in respect to individuals.
(Bolderson et al., 1997 p. 162)
Unemployment is clearly defined by the German
Employment Promotion Act as people who register at the
local employment office. This core definition misses a
large portion of the potential unemployed, for instance
newcomers to the labour market and married women who
have no entitlement to benefit and no reason to register.
The Germans call these people the ‘silent reserve’.
The dominance of Federal unemployment benefits and
Arbeitsamt in German unemployment has meant that
Sozialhilfe sat awkwardly in the past with these structures.
It is local policy that has changed to respond to the
problem of increased costs and the increased needs to
make benefits more geared to employment and training
programmes. In Hamburg, the Arbeitsamt is increasingly
used to determine the labour market status of claimants.
However, access to Federal employment programmes is a
more sensitive issue and requires local agreements
between municipalities and the Arbeitsamt.
The Netherlands
A common description of the Dutch economy since the
1980s is a ‘miracle’. This term refers to the turnaround of
dismal economic performance in the 1970s and early
1980s. Significant structural labour market problems
existed – high unemployment, negative job growth, high
replacement rates and a high proportion of the working-
age population claiming disability benefits in lieu of early
retirement or long-term unemployment. One of the key
ingredients to the turnaround has been a collective
agreement between the social partners to moderate wage
increases, restrain public spending and increase job
growth. Over the 1990s, there has been a consensus to
further tighten public spending, reduce non-wage costs on
employment and lower the number of inactive claimants
of social assistance and disability benefits.
Federal
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Ministry
of Health
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Social Affairs
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Figure 6 The German policy map
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Holland has been well placed economically and
geographically to benefit from European trade with a
large service sector (65 per cent of GDP). Politically, it
has relied on coalition government with a period of
Christian Democrat (CDA) led coalitions in the 1980s and
early 1990s under Ruud Lubbers. In the 1994 elections,
the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA) led a political resurgence
against proposals for pension reform and it has been the
major party in two subsequent governments. However,
liberal economic policies have continued and privatisation
– including the Employment Services and administration
of social security benefits – has carried on alongside
continued structural reform of taxes and benefits.
The Dutch have reduced the social security taxes on low-
paid employment (SPAK) and this is believed to have
created 60,000 jobs since 1996 (OECD, 2000a). A series
of tax credits to bolster incomes from low pay will be
introduced as part of a comprehensive review of the
income tax system in 2001. Active labour market
programmes have expanded to include work experience
and public employment programmes for the hard to serve,
and social assistance has been recast to prioritise social
and economic reintegration. Several changes have been
implemented to reassess the very large cohort of disabled
people on benefits but little success has been made in
moving these people into work. Numbers have begun to
grow again despite employment incentives to lower exits
from work and to increase re-entry.
The Dutch Claimant Reservoir
The Dutch social security system is a legacy of the corporate
post-war social contract made between the dominant
political players: the Christian Democratic Party, the Social
Democratic Party, the employers’ organisations and the trade
union movement. It prioritised full employment and
improvements in the welfare state, and adopted earnings-
related social insurance as core provision. Subsequently,
citizenship benefits – ‘people’s insurances’ – were
introduced, covering old age, widow pensions and health
care. Beneath such universal schemes was the Dutch system
of social assistance, conceived centrally but run by
municipal authorities. A statutory minimum wage was
introduced in the late 1960s and citizenship benefits and
social assistance rates were linked to that income level.
Contributory unemployment benefits – Werkloosheidswet
(WW) – are financed by equal employee and employer
contributions of 2.55 per cent of salary. Benefits are paid
at a basic rate of 70 per cent of previous earnings, less
income tax and social insurance contributions. There is
also a minimum level of benefit calculated according to
the social minimum, which is itself based on the minimum
wage. This means that a minimum level of 100 per cent of
the minimum wage is guaranteed for a married couple, 70
per cent for a single person and 90 per cent for a single
parent. Such minima echo the provisions of social
assistance and prevent the need for supplementation.
Indeed, if WW does fall below the equivalent rate of
social assistance, benefits can be increased to match this
level. There is also a maximum benefit calculation based
on an underlying wage rate of 305.96 Dutch florins per
day. Claimants have to pass two contributory thresholds to
qualify for benefit:
1 to have worked for one year in the past four to five
years (waived in part for women who have been at
home looking after children who only have to show
they have met 50 per cent of such a work record)
2 to have worked 26 out of 39 weeks prior to
unemployment.
Duration of WW varies according to age and work history.
Six months is the maximum duration for those with work
histories of four years or less, while five years is the
maximum for those with work histories of 40 years. What
happens when entitlement to WW ends? In the first
instance, benefits are extended for a period of up to two
years at a minimum level (70 per cent of the minimum
wage). They will be brought up to the equivalent of social
assistance where required, but without a means-test.
Sickness and disability benefits have been an infamous
part of the Dutch system because of the huge growth in
disability programmes during the 1980s (Aarts and De
Jong, 1996). Disability benefits – Wet op de
Arbeidsongesschikteidsverzekering (WAO) – in 1991 had
more than 900,000 claimants – some 13 per cent of the
labour force. The growth of the ‘disabled’ population was
thus a pool of hidden unemployment. This growth
coincided with the entry of a large cohort of younger
workers to the labour market that hindered the exit from
disability benefits for older workers with health problems.
The Dutch have now tackled this legacy by changing rules
and incentive structures to reduce access into and increase
flows out of sickness and disability cover. Since 1996, the
first year of sickness and disability cover for workers has
been privatised and taken out of social insurance. There
are mandatory obligations on employers to insure
privately and to provide sick pay for 52 weeks or to the
end of the employment contract if shorter. The sick pay is
at least 70 per cent of earnings, but can be higher
according to local union negotiation. There is a minimum
benefit that is equivalent to the minimum wage.
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Social insurance disability benefits (WAO) are now paid
only to those still disabled after one year and are assessed
more rigorously in order to assess ‘partial disability’, so
that the disability insurance pays for the loss of earning
capacity for the claimant while unemployment benefits
provide an additional element of income. Thus, only those
who after one year establish that they are wholly disabled
and unable to work can receive full disability benefits.
When assessing disability and ability to work, previous
work history and labour market demand have been taken
out of consideration. WAO is no longer of unlimited
duration but age is taken into account to target higher
benefits of longer duration to the older claimants. The
maximum duration is six months for those aged 33 to 37,
while WAO can be paid up to pension age (65) for those
aged over 58. At the end of these fixed-benefit periods,
eligibility for WAO is reassessed. The impact of
introducing much stricter tests on existing claimants was
lessened by transitional rules that exempt them from parts
of the reassessment. For British interest, one of the main
developments of the changes was that any WAO case
assessed as less than 80 per cent disabled is defined both
as partially disabled and unemployed, and must register
with the public employment services (Arbeidsbureau).
There have been several attempts to encourage demand
for workers with health problems in order to increase exits
from WAO. Legislation introduced a target for employers
to make the disabled 5 per cent of newly hired employees
but this has not been successful to date. There has been
the recent introduction of employer subsidies for hiring
disabled workers but the effect of this on job brokering for
the partially disabled claimant reservoir has yet to be
assessed. Reintegration measures are thus currently
predicated mainly on Arbeidsbureau job mediation – with
some access to public jobs designed to help the long-term
unemployed.
Social assistance for the unemployed claimants is called
RWW (Rijksgroepsregeling Werkloze Werknemers) and is
administered by a special social office – the Sociale
Dienst – in municipal authorities. The distinguishing
feature of RWW is the continued requirement to register
with the Arbeidsbureau. The Sociale Dienst co-ordinates
the payment of benefits and undertakes casework. Social
assistance is funded through a central government specific
grant paid for by general tax revenue that covers 90 per
cent of benefit costs. The remaining 10 per cent is found
from local revenue (in the main municipal block grant
funds from central government). Specific funds for job
creation and other employment-related programmes come
from central funds. The majority of social assistance
claimants are classified as ‘unemployed’, but there is both
a general benefit, Algemene Bijstandswet (ABW) – paid to
some lone parents, the elderly and others – and two
smaller schemes for more specific populations. The older
unemployed (those over 50) and older partially disabled
self-employed (over 55) can be covered by different social
assistance rules – IOAW/IOAZ (Inkomensvoorziening
Oudere en Gedeeltelijk Arbeidsongeschikte Werkloze
Werknemers/Gewezen Zelfstandigen) respectively.
The definition of the unemployed for social assistance is
very wide and differs remarkably from British
assumptions. Lone parents with children over primary
school age, the partners of claimants and partially disabled
people are all more likely to be defined as unemployed
than their British counterparts.
The Dutch policy map
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment
(Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgeledenheid or
SZW) oversees all social insurance and social assistance
policy as well as employment. Social insurance benefits
(other than pensions) – primarily WW and WAO – are
themselves overseen by sectoral boards –
Berijfsverenigingen (BVs) – that run five social security
organisations that are themselves co-ordinated by an
umbrella organisation (Lisv). Actual benefit
administration has been privatised and is run by agencies
– GAK (Gemeenschappelijk Administratiekantoor) offices
being the main ones for the unemployed. Local authorities
administer social assistance (although there is pressure to
privatise this administration). Active labour market
programmes for reintegrating both unemployed and social
assistance claimants are now run by privatised
organisations. The public employment service,
Arbeidsvoorziening (ABV), is a separate agency that
reports to the SZW and administers both brokering and
training services, which can be purchased by social
security providers, as well as other labour market services
such as work permits.
The complexities that arose from the divisions between
the social insurance bodies and from structural divide
between these and social assistance have been a major
focus of attention for the Dutch. Integration of front-line
employment services into single work-focused Centres for
Work and Income (CWIs) has therefore been a major area
of reform – but primarily driven by organisational
objectives. Under the original proposals, CWIs were to be
introduced in a bottom-up fashion under central guidance.
Each locality would draw up their own proposals and over
80 CWIs have been introduced. However, the private
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administration of social insurance benefits led to
institutional incentives that were unwilling to share the
larger costs of co-servicing harder-to-serve populations.
Since 1999, there has been more fundamental reform of
social insurance provision that effectively deprivatises
them and amalgamates them into a joint not-for-profit
conglomerate. This new UWV(Uitvoeringsorgaan
Werknemerverzekeringen) will take over all
administration of social insurance benefits. At the same
time, the ABV will be disbanded and the CWI will take
over all job-brokering services with all reintegration
programmes – education, training and employment run by
private providers.
Figure 7 summarises both the old and new structures
as they are either currently found or envisaged. The
old structures are shown in full lined and the new in
dashed lined detail. The actual benefits remain
unchanged and are shown in the boxes. CWI
implementation is supposed to be complete by the
beginning of 2001.
Welfare, employment and the claimant
reservoirs
These national descriptions have shown how far the
definition of who and what constitutes ‘welfare’ in
‘welfare to work’ differs across the five countries. There
are several conclusions.
• There are groups in the British welfare to work target
group that are not apparently covered in other
countries – for instance, long-term sick and disabled
people in France and Germany.
• The British emphasis on means-testing and flat-rate
benefits places great importance on determining
status on the basis of current claimant circumstances.
The French and German social insurance systems
tend to define people more on their past contributory
record and at their point of access to the system. This
means that, for instance, unemployed claimants can
have chronic illness and partial disablement and still
remain defined as unemployed.
Figure 7 The Dutch policy map
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• Employer-based schemes of sick pay, sickness benefit
and disability tend to protect their funds against
encroachment by unemployed cases. Dutch, French
and German systems give partial disability benefits to
supplement earnings. Full invalidity benefits paid to
people out of work require between 80 and 100 per
cent assessment of disability.
• The British definition of welfare also encompasses
groups that simply are not covered by benefits in
some other countries. In particular, this applies to
under 25 year olds in France and to the majority of
able-bodied unemployed without children in the
USA. (In France, the situation is somewhat more
complicated because young people can still be
indirectly covered by family tax allowances and by
family allowances, but less so, paid to their parents.)
• The different definitions and different relationships
between programmes and institutions make the
claimant reservoirs for active labour market
programmes difficult to compare exactly in their size
composition to the British welfare to work target group.
However, it is important to compare who is included in
each system in order to appreciate how far policy selects
claimant groups for active labour market programmes
from the potential reservoir and thus how far selection
alters our appreciation of their outcomes.
Figure 8 summarises the relative size and composition of
working-age claimant reservoirs in the five countries and
the main target groups for welfare to work programmes.
The four European systems each produce a claimant
reservoir of similar size – around 11 to 13 per cent of the
15 to 64 population. The USA stands out as having an
overall smaller reservoir, but one has to remember that
only around one-third of its unemployed are covered by
either UI or social assistance.
The national composition of the claimant reservoirs is also
noticeably different, with the British system having the
smallest proportion in contributory unemployment of any
of the five countries and the smallest proportion defined
as unemployed among the European countries. Britain and
the USA have the largest proportion of lone parents. The
size of the invalidity/disability claimant populations is
smallest in France and Germany and largest in the
Netherlands, GB and USA in descending order.
The targeting of welfare to work also differs greatly as
indicated in Figure 8 by the position and size of the arrow
indicators. The US has the smallest and most specific
target group – lone parents and the few others on social
assistance. European levels are higher. In France,
Germany and the Netherlands, the target groups are
primarily the unemployed – which, unlike the US, include
Figure 8 Claimant reservoirs and welfare to work target groups, 1997
Sources: DSS (1998a, Table 1); US Department of Commerce (2000); US Bureau of Labor current population survey;
DHHS (2000); US Social Security Administration (1998); US Department of Labor unpublished data on UI receipt;
UNEDIC (2000); CNAF (1999); unpublished data from UNEDIC and CNAF; unpublished data from CNAM;
Statistisches Bundesamt (1999); Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (1998); unpublished data from Verband Deutscher
Rentenversicherungsträger; Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (1998); Eurostat (2000).
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the long-term unemployed and which, unlike Britain,
include partially disabled claimants. These three European
countries also include lone parents where they are in
general social assistance schemes subject to their children
being of school age. The British target groups are
essentially the same as the continental European countries
but people with partial disability are, on the whole, a
separate group of claimants rather than part of the
unemployed population. The US long-term sick and
disabled claimants fall completely outside of the ‘welfare
to work’ rhetoric even though there have been a number
of schemes to promote work.
Figure 8 is intended as a summary of estimates based on
real claimant counts and not as a precise itemisation of
who is where and under what conditions. For instance,
where the composition of generic social assistance cannot
be exactly categorised – as in French RMI – this is shown
as an undifferentiated group. Figure 8 is also only a
snapshot of 1997 claimant numbers, chosen because it is
the most recent year for a comprehensive set of data
across countries and programmes. A snapshot misses the
dynamic nature of the national economies and policy
regimes. Germany and the USA, for example, were at
very different points in the economic cycle in 1997 and
the large number of invalidity benefit claimants in the
Netherlands is explained by an older cohort with
preserved rights to benefits.
Does the selection implied by the organisation of the
claimant reservoirs and the targeting of welfare to work
programmes have any discernable difference in national
profiles of employment and unemployment? This question
is now briefly explored before turning to Chapter 2 and a
discussion of labour market activation.
Unemployment, growth and the organisation of
the claimant reservoir
Moving away from a static picture of 1997, each of five
study countries has experienced cyclical rise and fall in
unemployment and underlying economic growth. Figure 9
shows the standardised unemployment rates between 1988
and 1999 for each country. By 1998 and 1999,
unemployment was falling in all five countries but from
very differing levels and with slightly different underlying
cycles. UK, French and American unemployment rates all
rose from 1990 but those in the Netherlands and Germany
continued to decline until 1991 and 1992 respectively. As
Figure 10 shows, actual recession, negative GDP growth,
occurred earliest in the USA and UK in 1991, while
Germany and France bottomed out two years later. The
Netherlands never had negative GDP growth in this period
but had its lowest growth rates in 1993. Since 1994, all
five countries have had positive annual growth.
Since recession, unemployment has fallen continuously in
the USA from 1992 and in the UK from 1993. In the
Netherlands it peaked in 1994 but has fallen rapidly since.
German unemployment rose in 1996 and 1997 to 10 per
cent and has subsequently fallen. 1997 is thus the worst
year in the past decade for German unemployment.
French unemployment, at around 12 per cent from 1992 to
1997, has also fallen in recent years.
The underlying structural rates of unemployment differ –
they are much higher in Germany and France than in the
Figure 9 Standardised unemployment rates, 1988–99
Source: OECD (2000b)
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three other countries (OECD, 2000c). However, when the
unemployed are put in a wider context of economic
activity and inactivity, a more nuanced picture emerges.
Taking the period since 1994 when all five countries have
had continuous growth despite differing unemployment
and cyclical histories, it appears that the unemployed and
inactive populations do not exactly correspond. Table 2
shows increases in employment (i.e. job growth)
alongside changes in unemployment and the contribution
that falling unemployment has made to job growth. Only
Germany has not had overall job growth between 1994
and 1998, unlike UK, France, Netherlands and the USA.
Employment has grown fastest in the Netherlands 12 per
cent, then the USA 6.8 per cent and the UK 5.6 per cent
and lastly France 3.1 per cent. This employment growth
has reduced the claimant reservoirs and especially the
unemployed. In these countries, the numbers of
unemployed decreased over the same time but at different
rates. The UK and Dutch unemployed fell by around a
third and American unemployment by 22 per cent. French
unemployment, as we know from Figure 9, fell least, by
just under 2 per cent. These differences are partly due to
the difference in the economic cycle between countries
and the original incidence of unemployment. However,
when we look at the crude proportion of job growth that is
attributable to declining unemployment, there are
substantial differences between the countries. Taking the
three countries with the largest job growth – the UK,
Netherlands and USA – decline in the UK’s unemployed
accounts for almost two-thirds of its job growth whereas
in the US and Netherlands such declines only account for
around a fifth.
One possible reason for this is that the unemployed
claimant group in Britain can be moved into jobs more
Table 2␣ ␣ Changes in employment and unemployment, 1994–98
% contribution of change
% growth in % growth in in unemployment to
employment unemployment growth in employment
UK 5.6 -33.3 64.0
France 3.1 -1.8 8.4
Germany -0.5 11.9 218.0
Netherlands 12.0 -31.5 19.5
USA 6.8 -22.3 21.0
Source: Author’s calculations from OECD (2000b).
Figure 10 Annual growth in GDP, 1988–99
Source: OECD (2000b)
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easily through the underlying sorting and selection of
policy regimes and institutions. The UK unemployed
contain few people with limitations on their ability to
work or their availability for work that arise from caring
for children and chronic ill health and disability. This is
less the case in the other countries.
But the story is not just about the unemployed; it is also
about the inactive populations who can be recruited into
the labour market during periods of job growth. However,
the inactive population is an extremely heterogeneous
group and there are large national differences in
composition. These can be accounted for by female
participation rates, participation in full-time education and
other factors. Table 3 shows the proportion of the 15–64
population groups (16–64 in the USA) who are inactive,
growth of such populations between 1994 and 1998, and
the proportion of this group who would like to work in
1994 and 1998. The inactive populations have been
adjusted to take account of the different national
participation rates in higher education (except in the USA,
where this could not be done).
The four European countries provide the most consistent
and contrasting comparison. The UK and Netherlands
have slightly higher proportions of working age
populations inactive – over 22 per cent – than Germany
(21 per cent) and France (19 per cent). These populations
grew between 1994 and 1998 by over 1.5 per cent in
France and Holland, by 1 per cent in the UK and by 0.5
per cent in Germany. However, when we turn to the
proportion of these populations that would like to work,
the UK has the highest proportion and this grew over the
period – from 23 to 25 per cent. The Netherlands also had
over 22 per cent of its inactive population who wanted to
work in 1994 but this declined slightly by 1998. Both
these countries experienced very large falls in
unemployment over the same period. In 1994, both France
and Germany, the high structural unemployment
countries, by comparison had around only 3 per cent of
their inactive populations who wanted to work. By 1998,
this had hardly changed in France – despite low job
growth and slowly falling unemployment, while in
Germany it had risen very markedly to 8.2 per cent.
The US data tell a different and not exactly consistent
story to the other four countries. They show 22 per
cent of 16–64s inactive with a large growth of almost 7
per cent between 1994 and 1998 but a decline in the
proportion that would like to work from 14.8 to 11.2
per cent.
When the two profiles of unemployment and inactivity are
considered together, there is circumstantial evidence to
support a proposition that the organisation of the claimant
reservoir has an impact on national profiles of
unemployment and inactivity, and on the take up of
employment by unemployed and inactive groups. The
evidence for British selection and sorting of its claimant
reservoir comes from the combination of relatively steep
declines in unemployment and the fact that over 60 per
cent of job growth is crudely explained by such declines.
At the same time, Britain also has a high and growing
proportion of inactive people who would like to work.
These trends are not shared to the same extent by the
countries that have also grown fastest and have least
unemployment – Netherlands and USA.
Summary of Chapter 1
How does the British definition of the target population
for welfare to work programmes compare with other
countries?
Table 3␣ ␣ Changes in inactivity and desire to work, 1994–98
Inactive as % % of inactive who
of all 15–64 Growth would like to work
population 1998* 1994–98 (%) 1994 1998
UK 22.2 1.0 23.0 25.0
France 19.4 1.7 3.0 2.8
Germany 21.4 0.5 3.3 8.2
Netherlands 22.7 1.6 22.3 20.9
USA** 22.0 6.8 14.8 11.2
* Less those in education.
**With no reduction for those in education and 16–64 population.
Source: Author’s calculations from Eurostat (1996, 2000) and US Bureau of Census and Bureau of Labour
Statistics (unpublished data).
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• All five countries divide claimants into a reservoir of
several claimant groups. The divisions are more often
based on distinctions between the socially insured
and socially assisted in the USA and continental
Europe, but all systems appear to have problems at
the boundaries between sickness/disability and labour
market activity.
• The British definition of unemployed claimants
contains fewer people with sickness and disability
than continental European systems where social
insurance is more dominant.
• American unemployed claimants represent only
around one-third of the unemployed. British and
continental European systems cover more of the
unemployed – both short-term and long-term
unemployed.
• The American definition of ‘welfare’ represents not
only a very small and particular group of claimants –
families with children on social assistance – but also
a policy area with low political support for the
claimants, who are highly marginalised and subject to
significant prejudice – often implicitly racial.
• European continental selection for welfare to work
programmes is based on the insured unemployed and
the non-disabled social assistance population.
• Britain has lagged behind America and Continental
Europe in offering welfare to work provision for non-
employed social assistance claimants. Such claimants
tend to have access to a fuller range of services
abroad.
• Britain appears to be able to move more of its
unemployed into work during periods of job growth
than other countries experiencing a similar economic
cycle. At the same time, it has a larger and growing
proportion of its inactive population who would like
to work.
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Policies that ‘activate’ the receipt of cash benefits in order
to encourage participation in work are at the heart of
welfare to work programmes. However, the term
‘activation’ is often used misleadingly to imply that
benefits were ‘passive’ beforehand. This has rarely been
the case unless claimants had already been assessed as
having no need to look for work as a condition of claim.
Even where such ‘passive’ claimants had been allowed to
receive benefits without looking for work, they had often
continued to do so. One change in policy that has already
been identified in Chapter 1 has been to reassess the
policy distinction between groups in the claimant
reservoirs that are required to register as unemployed and
others. This theme – of redefining boundaries – is further
examined in this chapter along with some of the ways that
reorganisation of the claimant reservoir is occurring in the
five countries.
A further theme of activation is in the growing use of
more strict entitlement rules. This can mean that the rules
about job search become more onerous and/or that
participation in activation programmes becomes a
compulsory condition of entitlement. This chapter
examines a range of approaches to changing entitlement
to benefits. One extreme position has been to withdraw all
entitlement to benefits with the expectation that employment
will replace welfare for the majority of claimants while
other approaches have sought to increase obligations of
claimants either to move into work or to train.
Policy across all five countries – and indeed across the EU
and OECD countries – is putting more emphasis on
preventing long-term unemployment and on increasing
the focus on work and training. At the heart of the new
(so-called) approach is the principle of improving
individual employability. The OECD Jobs Study (OECD,
1994) and the European Employment Strategy formulated
at the Luxembourg Employment Summit in 1998
encapsulate such approaches. The term ‘employability’ is
ill defined. Behind the fuzzy concept there are different
theoretical approaches but an emerging coherent set of
policies that differ between countries (Gazier, 1999).
European Commission guidelines have defined policy
benchmarks and policy priorities for the young and long-
term unemployed, and seek to extend active training and
work experience programmes to the unemployed and
others in the EC (EC, 1998).
This new policy approach therefore incorporates a
widening of access to welfare to work programmes and
greater conditionality. The task of administering
programmes increases as a result and the role of other
organisations besides the public employment services
grows. This chapter also assesses the roles of third-party
intermediaries in welfare to work programmes.
The chapter is organised around five core themes in
activation and economic insertion. These reflect a range of
policy changes that have been used to make benefits more
work-orientated and to improve outflows into work:
• redefining the boundaries between claimant groups
and the provision of co-ordinated administration of
benefits and services through such initiatives as
‘work-focused gateways’
• altering entitlement to benefits through a range of
options from terminating entitlement altogether,
making entitlement more conditional and increasing
obligations to compulsory participation for those who
are entitled
• changing the focus of work participation and training
• moving towards a more individual-centred approach
• using third-party intermediaries.
Redefining the boundaries –
co-ordinated administration
The first issue is to address the problems of boundaries
and organisation that have been outlined in Chapter 1.
Several countries have attempted to co-ordinate services
and benefits more effectively across organisational
boundaries. The British problem resulted from a centrally
run but highly categorised flat-rate system in which only
the unemployed had access to active labour market
programmes and public employment services. The New
Deals are aimed at the stocks of claimants but access to
the benefit system is also being reorganised around what
has been called a ‘single work-focused gateway’. The
implementation of this approach is currently being piloted
in a number of sites based on both physical and call-centre
based approaches, and has been named the ONE service.
The basis of the new service is to provide all non-working
claimants of working age with a single point of contact for
their claim. To do so, the ONE service brings together
Benefits Agency, Employment Service and local authority
Housing Benefit assessment (and Child Support Agency)
so that all aspects of a claim can be dealt with at a single
point. In addition, the ONE approach offers access to
training and labour market services through a personal
2␣ ␣ Activation and economic insertion: welfare TO work
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advisor to all claimants, not just the unemployed. The
approach introduced a compulsory work-focused
interview by a personal advisor as part of the claim from
April 2000. This interview is part of normal procedures
for assessment and casework for the unemployed, but is
used for others to plan a work or training strategy.
The complete merger of the Benefits Agency and
Employment Service into a single Working Age Agency
has also been announced but discussions are still under
way about how this will be implemented and it is unclear
how far the ONE approach will be carried forward into
the new agency.
Dutch policy has also moved to introduce a single work-
focused access to social assistance and social insurance
benefits for working age people – Centres for Work and
Income (CWIs). However, the primary aims of the CWI
approach appear based on organisational integration under
a high-pressure climate for increased efficiency and
privatisation of administration. Privatised public
employment service (PES) and social insurance
administration meant greater co-ordination was required
to ensure that dumping (leaving the hardest to serve to
others) and cream skimming (choosing the most
employable) were reduced. This is one reason why the
‘comprehensive approach’, including the four-phase
approach to profiling claimants, was introduced – to
distribute tasks consistently between the competing and
separate administrative interests. Implementation has been
planned incrementally on the ground so that each
municipality can set up its own working arrangements. All
claimants should have access to a CWI site by 2001.
The US move to ‘one-stop’ provision was primarily
driven to bring together the employment and training
programmes that spanned several agencies into single
access points. This move has been accompanied by a
tightening of administrative budgets, which has
encouraged efficiency improvements and greater use of
information technology. Customer service has become a
more important issue at the same time as private providers
of employment services have grown and hence self-
service provision for job seekers has also grown.
Employment services one-stops are not usually linked
directly to welfare reform. Indeed, the whole policy
direction of employment and training programmes in the
US has been to move towards workers who need to reskill
or relocate rather than the disadvantaged (OECD, 1999b,
p. 198). However, in some States, the labour market
information side of public employment services has been
incorporated into welfare employment services. For State-
based welfare, then, the picture of administrative co-
ordination differs hugely between States. The work-first
approach has encouraged the positioning of employment
services and personal advice together. Wisconsin and New
York City have followed similar policies of integrating
welfare offices and welfare employment services into a
single point of contact – called Job Centers in New York.
However, other aspects of claiming, such as verification
of identity and address, were separated prior to this in
New York – a move seen as deterring claims by local
advocates. One hugely important issue for co-ordination
in welfare policy is the delivery of Food Stamps and
Medicare that have historically piggybacked on AFDC/
TANF claims. The move to a co-ordinated and
diversionary approach to TANF (that is, an approach that
seeks to divert claimants from entering the system –
explained in more detail later in this chapter) has meant
that administration of Food Stamps and Medicare for the
same population has suffered. Indeed, in New York City, it
led to litigation because the new Job Centers were not
implementing Federal procedures for claiming and
entitlement.2
French and German co-operation and co-ordination are
not as extensive as in the Netherlands and Britain. Since
1998, the federally run and financed German employment
service has been encouraged to set joint goals and
programmes in place with municipal social assistance.3
This has led to specific staff being employed to deal with
Sozialhilfe claimants in Arbeitsamten as well as integrated
claimant intakes, for example in Harburg in Hamburg.
However, such initiatives do not alter the fundamental
financial and structural differences between locally
financed social assistance and federally financed
unemployment benefits and employment services. The
benefits of employment programmes for Sozialamt are
still too often seen as qualifying them sufficiently to pass
over the contributory barrier and onto the Federal bill
(Vosages et al., 2001). The public employment service in
France, ANPE (Agence Nationale pour l’Emploi), is seen
as the central agency to the wide range of employment
programmes and the central agency for referral. ANPE has
had the task of benefit entitlement and conditionality
taken from it and given to the ASSEDICs. This should
enable ANPE to focus more on vacancy taking and job
brokering, and to widen its services to claimants of RMI.
The co-ordination of these services for claimants who are
not part of the core unemployed target group is the job of
2New York Times, 23 January 1999. The City admitted that strict
diversion procedures violated Federal Law and changed
administrative practice – see New York Times, 25 May 1999.
3InfoMISEP Policies, No. 63, Autumn 1998, p. 28.
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the Prefêt who oversees regional plans and agrees local
plans for urban renewal, youth employment, etc. In
practice, this means that local ANPE offices have had
increased specialised staff complements to take forward
specific initiatives, and that links between Mission
Locales and other agencies have been strengthened.
However, even those in the system recognise that
brokering outcomes across the many agencies and
programmes that exist is to push against great
bureaucratic inertia.
All the moves to greater co-ordination are based on
similar concerns about selection, administrative
inefficiency and greater co-ordination that should benefit
both claimants and policy makers. However, evidence of
significant financial benefits is not as yet forthcoming – it
is too early to say in most instances. Forcing the different
participating organisations to co-ordinate and act in a
crosscutting, rational way brings up different views on
what is efficient and rational. Interviewing a
representative of GAK in the Netherlands brought out
how much resentment there was in redesigning their
procedures to take into account the harder-to-serve social
assistance claimants. Britain may face similar dilemmas
and conflicts of interest with an Employment Service
unused to helping those who are most distant from the
labour market and expensive to help because of child-care
needs and illness and/or disability. The pressures to lower
the benefit budget for these claimants, who are very likely
to have longer than average time on benefits, will make
access to employment services a critical issue for the
DSS/Benefits Agency. Amalgamation of the two sets of
strategic interests – ES and BA – will not solve the
problem in itself. The potential benefits are great as long
as increasing resources for employment services
accompany widening access. However, there are real
dangers too. How will the needs of claimants for income
security out of work be balanced against the pressures to
widen the work focus? Helping the hardest to serve is
difficult. Significant reductions in benefit spending may
not come easily and policy makers may in their frustration
seek to choose to alter rules of entitlement in addition to,
or as an alternative to, one-stop approaches.
Altering entitlement to benefits
All five countries have altered the rules of entitlement to
benefits for some groups in the claimant reservoir to
encourage movement into work. However, the extent of
such changes varies greatly.
Terminating entitlement
At one extreme is the experience in the USA where the
tendency has been to introduce dramatic changes in
entitlement that have immediate effect. There are groups
who have had all the benefit entitlement removed, others
who have had it reduced and many who have had to meet
completely revised conditions of entitlement. British
readers should realise that these changes are to social
assistance cases – ‘welfare’ in the US sense – and are
usually introduced without safeguards for losers. This is in
complete contrast to British policy change where cuts to
entitlement, for instance the reduction of lone parent
benefits on Income Support in April 1998 and the
complete removal of Severe Disablement Allowance in
1999, were only for new claimants. British claimants are
usually protected from nominal cuts in benefit.
In the USA, State-run General Assistance (GA) schemes –
especially those for the able-bodied without children –
have been hugely cut back in recent years. Since 1989, the
number of States providing such benefits has almost
halved from 25 to 13 (Gallagher, 1999). Overall, the
numbers claiming GA fell from one million to 770,000
over the same period (US Department of Commerce,
2000) because the States with the largest GA populations
– California and New York – have maintained them, but at
often reduced levels. Termination of GA was advocated
on the grounds that the recipients were able to and should
work rather than live on benefits. Evidence from the few
studies that followed the fortunes of such terminated
claimants suggests that this is not always the case. In
Michigan, two years after GA ended and 80,000 people
lost benefits, only 38 per cent had found formal
employment in the intervening time (Danziger and
Kossoudji, 1995). When the reasons for post-termination
employment and unemployment were examined, it was
found that older claimants, those with disability and poor
health, and black men fared worst in employment – even
when previous work history was taken into account
(Henly and Danziger, 1996).
The 1996 US welfare reforms (PRWORA) also instituted
time limits to TANF benefits for families with children.
There is a Federal funding limit that means that States
receive no Federal support for cases that have received
TANF benefits for more than 60 months in their lifetime.
States have discretion to operate different time limits and
just under half have implemented tougher rules. Families
had thus already reached time limits in 18 states by the
summer of 2000. The situation is complex on the ground
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because States exempt claimants from, or extend, such
lower time limits in certain circumstances. For instance,
Oregon stops the clock on time limits when claimants
participate in work activities but sanctions those claimants
who do not participate by ending their benefit, so
compliant claimants never reach the state time limit. This
growing policy practice seems to reflect a concern that
claimants who remain on benefits for the longest periods
are the hardest to serve. They have most barriers to
independent sustained employment and under the post-
1996 rules they will also have complied with strict
participation rules. Florida has followed an approach that
has allowed extensions to applicants who requested them
– resulting in very small numbers of terminations.
However, elsewhere, State time limits have kicked in and
have withdrawn benefits from thousands of cases, as
Table 4 shows for a selection of US States.
Table 4 shows how far implementation of welfare reform
differs at the local level. The percentage of the caseload
that reaches the time limit ranges widely from over half in
Connecticut (55 per cent) to under 5 per cent in five other
States. However, the implementation of full termination
(there are no instances of States implementing benefit
reductions reported here) occurs at very high levels in
both sorts of State. Two States stand out in the size of
their time-limit impacts. Nearly one quarter of Arizona’s
claimants reached the State time limit and had benefits
terminated, while Connecticut cut benefits from over two-
thirds of its time-limited claimants, knocking out one-
third of its total caseload.
European approaches that have ended entitlement have occurred
only for the under-18s in Britain and the Netherlands. Evidence
from both countries points to a substantial minority of this age
group not participating in work, training or benefits as a result
(Bentley and Gurumurthy, 1999).
The evidence of the effectiveness of terminating
entitlement as a method of increasing work participation
is mixed. The argument that providing benefits reduces
work participation is now widely accepted, but any
argument that complete withdrawal of benefits promotes
employment for all who would otherwise claim benefit
seems completely misplaced. The US experience shows
how dangerous such an approach could be to the British
Government’s aim to reduce poverty, inequality and social
exclusion. The US debate has allowed the poor – and
especially the poor who claim ‘welfare’ – to be seen as a
marginal and separate underclass, a ‘them’ who are not
like the working, tax-paying ‘us’ (Blank, 1998; Gilens,
1999). Complete withdrawal of benefits was an option
that was implemented by policy makers and the results
have not resulted in economic reintegration for many who
have lost entitlement.
Increasing conditionality
While removing entitlement to cash benefits is primarily
an American phenomenon, all five countries have
tightened conditions of entitlement to benefits – either to
lower benefit rates in order to improve replacement ratios,
alter potential duration of benefit, and/or increase the onus
on the claimant to job search and actively engage in work.
Again, the USA stands at one end of the continuum of this
trend. Indeed, at the strictest end of the continuum, it can
be difficult to distinguish policies that alter entitlement
from those that remove it altogether.
(a) Removing enforceable entitlement to and access to
benefits
The impact of the ending of Federal rules of entitlement to
TANF has enabled States to implement a range of rules
about who can claim welfare and under what conditions.
Most States have adopted an overall approach to welfare
known as ‘work first’ – but this label hides a large
Table 4␣ ␣ State time limits in action
% caseload reached % of time-limited
Caseload time limit by late 1998 claimants cut off
Arizona 37,008 23.2 96.7
Connecticut 40,998 55.0 63.7
Florida 98,671 1.2 <1
Illinois 164,177 1.6 25.7
North Carolina 68,020 0.6 95.4
South Carolina 23,253 2.2 70.5
Tennessee 57,059 8.8 16.0
Vermont 40,791 1.3 100.0
Source: Author’s calculations from Havemann and Vobejda (1998).
Note: Selection of States as in original article.
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variation in what is actually implemented on the ground.
The work-first approach became prominent after the
Californian GAIN evaluations of the early 1990s. These
MDRC evaluations (Riccio et al., 1994) compared two
approaches to welfare to work: one based on finding work
as immediately as possible and the other based on
improving education and skills. The evaluation took
results from different County administration districts that
had implemented one or other of the models and found
significant and substantial increases in employment and
earnings, and decreased poverty in the work-first sites –
particularly Riverside County. Although the differences
were not very great, they represented a real step change in
quantifiable policy outcomes from previous research.
American welfare policy makers perceived that at last
they had something that ‘worked’.
The overall philosophy of work-first approaches is ‘that any job
is a good job and that the best way to succeed in the labour
market is to join it, developing work habits and skills on the job
rather than in a classroom. Work first programmes also share a
strong message that, for participants, employment is both the
goal and the expectation’ (Brown, 1997, p. 2).
But, in practice, the implementation of employment-
focused welfare has meant very different approaches.
Work-first principles can operate on all parts of the
welfare caseload, and policies for the claimant stocks and
outflows are described in greater detail below. However,
implementation of work-first principles at the inflow stage
of claiming benefits can have very significant impact on
de facto entitlement to benefit. Some States, for instance
Wisconsin, Oregon and more recently New York City,
have implemented strict tests of up-front job search before
applications for benefit will be considered. In other words,
proof that one has looked for work is a prerequisite for a
claim. For instance, evidence of 60 hours of job search
within 30 days is required in the ‘W2’ scheme in
Wisconsin (of which 50 per cent must be verifiable
employer contacts) (Holcolm et al., 1998). The effect of
such policies on inflow rates can be dramatic – for
instance, new claims fell by 75 per cent in the New York
offices where this was introduced in the summer of 1998.
When the W2 scheme was first introduced in Wisconsin
and all of the existing caseload had to reapply under the
new conditions, 53 per cent overall did not continue
claiming and, even in the key urban area of Milwaukee,
43 per cent did not continue claiming (Swartz et al.,
1999). One effect of such a policy change is deliberately
to remove TANF as a frictional unemployment benefit for
a group of low-paid families with children, when only
around 11 per cent of them qualify for UI (Vroman, 1998).
These and other up-front changes together tend to be
labelled as ‘diversion’ policies and include the provision
of one-off assistance or grants to provide for a need that
underlies the claim for welfare, such as paying for the
repair of a car that is used to get to work. Other diversion
programmes include the identification and use of
alternatives to welfare such as child care, Food Stamps
and other assistance that can accompany work. Some
diversion programmes will encourage seeking help from
family and community resources rather than from public
benefits.
Together, these diversion programmes can have the effect
of fundamentally changing entitlement to benefits but
much depends on the manner and style of their
implementation. Where State approaches are driven by
aims that emphasise reducing the welfare caseload
without also emphasising sustainable and good quality in-
work support, their value as welfare to work programmes
should be questioned.
(b) Compulsion and increasing obligations of claimants
All five countries have changed the obligations of their
claimants in some form or another in recent times. This is
especially true for unemployed claimants but less so for
lone parents.
The largest contrast in programmes for lone parents is
between Britain and the other four countries. We are
unique in that we do not expect labour market
participation of lone parents until their youngest child is
16 (secondary school leaving age). However, recent
changes to benefit rules mean that, since April 2000, lone
parents have had to participate in a work-focused
interview when demanded of them in certain
circumstances. This is true for new claimants in the ONE
service pilot areas and will also be the case in other areas
where compulsory work-focused interviews are being
tried out for lone parents. This mandatory participation in
work or job search is very new in Britain, and is being
introduced very tentatively and sensitively to ensure that
parental decisions on the best interests of children are not
unduly ignored. However, it is of longer standing and for
a larger group of lone parents elsewhere.
Mandatory work participation for lone parents has been
established as a central tenet of American policy. Prior to
1988, lone parents with children under the age of six
(primary school age) were exempt from expectations to
work or look for work. This age was reduced to three
under the Family Support Act and then, in the 1996 Act,
all age restrictions were left to States. Twenty-three States
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use a 12-months rule (to match Federal assumptions on
participation) and a further 16 States have six months or
under. Wisconsin expects parental work compliance once
a baby is three months old.
Research has shown that mandation raises participation in
both education and work-focused activities and thus raises
outflows from benefit (Freedman et al., 2000). However,
the evidence of the effect of mandation on children is
mixed, showing small negative consequences for health,
small positive consequences for cognitive development,
and both positive and negative emotional and behavioural
effects (Hamilton et al., 2000). Most of this evidence is
from pre-TANF evaluation.
However, the positive message from mandation has to be
put alongside the negative evidence of the effect of
sanctions – which are an essential part of mandatory
schemes in the USA. Sanctions as penalties for non-
compliance have grown under the TANF regime. States
have often gone beyond Federal guidelines and
requirements to comply with Federal law. Thirty-six states
impose full family sanctions (removing benefits from
children as well as the adult) and 39 impose sanctions for
fixed periods – even after the claimants comply with
participation rules (Goldberg and Schott, 2000). Estimates
of the total number of claimants sanctioned suggest that
around 5 per cent of the caseload was sanctioned in any
month in 1998 and that two-thirds of all sanctioned
claimants did not return to benefit (GAO, 2000). Over the
first two years of TANF, it is estimated that 360,000 have
left because of sanctions. In other words, sanctions
account for around one-quarter of the fall in TANF
families across the USA.
None of the other four countries has pursued work
participation so relentlessly for families with pre-school
children. However, Germany and the Netherlands have
extended participation requirements down to primary
school age. Participation below this age depends on actual
provision of pre-school nursery places. Participation in
France has always been assumed to occur once the
youngest child reached the age of three – although no
‘benefit sanctions’ exist in name, the main benefit for lone
parents, API, ends at this point. To continue coverage, the
lone parent must make a separate claim for RMI. Sanction
policies for lone parents are not nearly as widespread in
Europe as in America.
Turning to the unemployed, the main assumptions about
mandation are more consistent across the five countries.
The status of unemployment requires specific proof (of
not having work) and behaviour (of looking actively for
work). However, implementation of these principles
differs greatly.
Registration as unemployed is a prerequisite for specific
unemployment insurance in all countries and for
unemployment assistance schemes where they exist. In
general, the following familiar criteria apply: registration
as seeking work, being capable of and available for work,
actively seeking work and accepting suitable work or
employment programme. The definitions of these criteria
have changed over the 1990s, particularly in the UK and
the Netherlands. Even so, the Netherlands, France and
Germany still base their principles of labour market
integration more on individual qualification, work
experience, and pay and conditions than the USA or UK –
particularly for those with contributory rights to benefit.
Activating benefits through programmes of labour market
reintegration has grown in the Netherlands and Germany.
Since the early 1900s, Dutch social security agencies were
given responsibility for activating and reintegrating their
clients, and buying services from the public employment
service and other organisations. These agencies were
given organisational incentives to reduce caseloads and
the power to sanction claimants.
Unemployed claimants of social assistance are formally
part of the unemployed clientele of the public
employment service under differing circumstances. In
Netherlands, all claimants are assessed for their labour
market readiness and those unemployed (including lone
parents with school-aged children and partially disabled
people) have to submit a review form every month,
outlining changes in personal circumstances and job search.
In Germany, there is Federal encouragement to link social
assistance to the public employment service but local
practice varies. In the Harburg district of Hamburg, one of
the pioneering local areas, joint intake assessment
between the Sozialamt and Arbeitsamt is the norm with
labour market readiness being assessed for all claimants in
a similar policy to the ONE pilots. Routine assessment of
work options and progress in finding a job during the
periodic reassessments of eligibility, or when claimants’
circumstances change, is carried out in a ‘caseloading’
approach. Continued job search is thus ensured for
claimants who have few obstacles to employment, while
others are referred to training courses and specialist
providers of employment services.
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The situation in France is that all RMI claimants are
supposed to enter into a contract in which they agree to a
plan for social and/or labour market reintegration. Where
the second is present, they will be referred to ANPE for
job matching and job clubs, and other services. ANPE is
the access point for all of the temporary job contracts and
subsidised jobs that typify the French approach, which is
outlined in Chapter 3.
In France, Germany and Holland, the agencies running
social assistance have tended to expand labour market
services for their clients – often because employment
services are predominantly aimed at the core client group
of insured unemployment benefit claimants.
When analysing sanctions and compliance rates for the
unemployed (and other groups), it is difficult always to
accurately distinguish between behavioural and
administrative issues, and this problem is compounded in
international comparison. For instance, a claimant who
does not attend an interview can have their claim to
benefit cancelled in some countries or made subject to a
sanction. Additionally, highly formalised and
administrative procedures can generate many points at
which claimants can ‘fail’ and fall out of the system. For
instance, the New York City claim process has
fingerprinting and residence-checking processes in
separate offices alongside the diversionary Job Centers
described above. Additionally, the NYC administration of
General Assistance has historically stopped a sample of
cases periodically as a method of testing continued
eligibility – if the claimant comes in to see what has
happened the case is reinstated but if not it is closed.
International comparisons of unemployed sanction rates
by the OECD are shown in Figure 11. The USA has the
highest rates of sanctions – 57 per cent of claimant stocks
overall made up of 35.4 per cent sanctions for labour
market behaviour and 21.6 per cent for administrative
infractions. The UK has an overall sanction rate of 10.3
per cent made up of 5.5 per cent labour market and 4.8 per
cent administrative infractions, while Germany has a low
rate by OECD standards of just 1.1 per cent labour market
sanctions. No figures were available for France and the
Netherlands.
However, these gross sanction rates rely on quite different
underlying approaches. Many of the US sanctions
represent single weeks of benefit entitlement that are
removed if there is a failure to prove adequate job search
for that week. The USA has few or no sanctions for failing
to attend ALMP programmes as it has so few that are
directly linked to the unemployed. The US figures also
completely miss the huge sanction rates for lone parents
on TANF benefits that are discussed above. The UK,
however, has many ALMPs of very short duration at
which attendance can be low, which leads to higher
sanction rates. Sanctions for refusal of work will also
depend on how much active job matching occurs – for
instance, in Germany – as against the higher rates in the
UK and USA that rely on advertising vacancies. It is
possible that higher sanction rates occur because of a
mismatch between advertised vacancies and claimants’
actual suitability and more specific job matches.
Figure 11 Annual sanction rates for unemployed claimants in the UK, USA and Germany
Source: OECD (2000c, Table 4.2).
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Lessons from altering eligibility
What can be drawn as lessons from the evidence on
changing entitlement and increasing obligations? The
tough US rules show that rules of entitlement can be
tightened to an extent that significantly discourages entry
onto benefits and effectively makes many potential
claimants ineligible. The wisdom of this approach must be
doubted where high labour market turnover leads to
repeated spells of employment and unemployment for
many potential claimants. What is gained by removing
frictional unemployment from the welfare rolls? Lower
aggregate spending and lower caseloads certainly but at
the costs of missing a whole group with legitimate claims
to support – especially given their work participation. This
approach also raises questions about the overall aims of
policy as it reduces the problem to a simple ‘on or off
welfare’ choice when access to welfare could be seen as
an opportunity to raise employability and to break the
low-pay no-pay cycle for such cases.
What is there to learn from the high sanction rates in the
USA that account for a quarter of caseload decline? The
simple lesson is that tough rules and strict implementation
lower the caseload. But it is important for British readers
to remember that there are no real safeguards for
claimants against many of the decisions that are made
against them in the US, and that such sanctioned exits
from welfare tend to be associated with the least skilled
and least educated, and with poor post-welfare
employment histories (see discussion in Chapter 4).
European approaches are often ‘tougher’ on lone parents
than in Britain but are usually predicated on the actual
availability of child care. That means there is usually a
place set up that precedes or coincides with the move into
work and thus underpins the move off welfare. This has to
be contrasted with the British and to some extent the US
approaches, which are based on individual subsidies
towards the price of child care that usually come into
payment immediately on or after the move into work.
Either way, the child-care question demonstrates the
crucial importance of child care to low-skilled female
participation in the labour market. The right to child care,
and the responsibility of public authorities to ensure its
quality, appropriateness and affordability, is central to the
issue of rights and responsibilities to welfare.
That leads us to the question of when lone parents should
be expected to move off welfare and into work. Wisconsin
proudly states that its policy of requiring participation
after 12 weeks matches the realities of working mothers
who have only 12 weeks’ maternity leave and is thus
equitable. This seems to miss the point that pregnancy,
childbirth and security of employment at the lower end of
the US labour market are not the norm. Britain is
becoming more European by putting renewed emphasis
on the rights of paternity and maternity leave, and on
family-friendly employment. Family- and employment-
friendly welfare will have to make the claimants’ choice
to mix child rearing, work, and education and training a
real one. As such, extending compulsion would have to be
carefully approached and accompanied by large additional
expenditure to increase opportunities – not only to work
but also to train and receive child care simultaneously.
The lessons for the unemployed seem less clear – the
evidence from British evaluations suggests that, compared
to the more passive European approach, we are
comparatively successful in moving the unemployed into
work and our coverage of the unemployed is not as poor
as in the USA. The real issues for comparison are based
more on the efficacy of moving the unemployed into work
quickly as opposed to investing more in training and
education and on the issue of how to help the most
disadvantaged. The next three sections address these
issues.
Increasing focus on work and training
The overall move in policy across the OECD and Europe
is towards a more active work-based policy environment.
Claimants must do more to engage in work and there is
now a general agreement that periods of benefit
entitlement without strong activation should be limited.
The debate in the USA in the late 1980s was over what
was best for claimants – quick entry into work, or
education and training and then work. The Californian
GAIN evaluation tested the assumptions in an
experimental design and found greater significant
reductions in spending and poverty, and increases in work
participation and income for the work-first model (Riccio
et al., 1994). US Welfare reform was dominated by the
adoption of work-first principles both in the Federal
design of TANF block grants and in State programmes.
But the role of education and training in US welfare has
not disappeared.
US Federal rules stipulate that TANF claimants must work
after two years on benefit, with few exceptions. States
must comply with rising targets for the proportion of their
caseload being engaged in work activity: 25 per cent in
1997 rising to 50 per cent in 2002. Lone parents must
participate for at least 20 hours per week in 1997 and this
rose to 30 hours by 2000. Two-parent families must work
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35 hours per week from 1997. Failure to participate in
work requirements can result in either a reduction or
termination of benefits. There are exemptions – lone
parents with a child under six who are without child care
cannot be penalised for failure to meet the work
requirements. States can exempt single parents with
children under 12 months and disregard these cases in the
calculation of participation rates for up to 12 months.
TANF work activities include unsubsidised or subsidised
employment, on-the-job training, work experience,
community service and 12 months of vocational training.
Up to six weeks of job search (no more than four
consecutive weeks) count towards the work requirement.
However, no more than 25 per cent of those meeting the
participation rates of each state’s caseload may count
towards the work requirement target solely by
participating in vocational training or by being a teenage
parent in secondary school.
The extremes in implementation of work-first principles
in which States demand pre-claim job search as part of a
diversionary approach have already been outlined. More
generally, the implementation of work first has been to
maximise job search as an activity at an early stage in a
claim – often through job club activity. However, even
within work-first programmes, work is not always put
forward as the first and/or only option.
One reason for the high profile of work-first programmes
is that the Riverside County site in the Californian GAIN
evaluation showed such strong and significant impacts on
poverty, spending and earnings using a strong work-first
approach when compared to employment and training
based approaches in Los Angeles County and other sites
(Riccio et al., 1994). But subsequent evidence on the
relative merits of the two approaches has been more
mixed. Analysis over a longer period in California has
thrown some doubt about the longer-term costs and
savings of the GAIN work-first approach. (Flaming et al.,
1998). Away from California, the evidence of the two
approaches has not produced such stark differences in
outcomes and this has led to a reappraisal of the
underlying assumptions of solely relying on work-first
principles (GAO, 1999; Strawn, 1998).
The US Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS) has also gained a growing body of evidence
about what works best through the National Evaluation of
Welfare to Work Strategies (NEWWS) programme. Two-
year results from a comparison of work-first and
education-based programmes where mandation was a
consistently strong element showed less significant
differences in costs and consequences than from the
GAIN programme (Hamilton et al., 1997). The fact that
two-year results showed little difference was surprising
since the investment of time in training usually means that
such programmes have longer lead-in times on work
participation and earnings.
The highest performing programme in recent evaluation
evidence from NEWWS is one from Portland, Oregon.
This programme had a forceful employment message but
also offered high-quality education and training
programmes, and strong job-development and placement
services. Job search and a participation mandate – the
usual constituents of work first – were also included. The
Portland programme also gained from employment
advisors encouraging claimants to hold out for the right
job rather than take any employment just to leave welfare.
Such evidence is beginning to undermine the argument by
Larry Mead and others that any job as soon as possible is
better than welfare. Remedial education programmes
aimed at those with no high school qualification, and with
English as a second language and other basic literacy
needs showed significant impacts (Freedman et al., 2000).
On the other hand, classroom-based teaching without
strong vocational focus and unsupported long-term
education tend to be successful only for claimants who
complete such courses and are used to more academic
approaches.
In the European countries, access to education and active
labour market programmes for lone parents tends to be
more of a problem. Specific targeting of child care to
accompany such activity is expensive but does occur in a
minority of cases. Otherwise, the approaches tend to rely
on child care being set up – often with the help of the
welfare case worker – before enrolment onto education
and training programmes occurs. The British New Deal
for Lone Parents has a small budget for training and
education, and tends to be a non-compulsory work-first
approach (Millar, 2000) based on personal advisors and
improving information about and planning for a return to
work.
British unemployed claimants have faced increasing
pressure on, and scrutiny of the status of, active job search
over the 1980s and 1990s. Most recently, the Jobseekers’
Allowance (JSA) regime introduced in October 1996 has
made increased and more consistent job search standard,
and evaluation shows it has increased outflow rates into
work (Rayner et al., 2000). This systematic increase in
activation operates across interventions based on duration
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of unemployment – for instance, Restart interviews at 13
and 26 weeks when the individual job-seeking plan is
reviewed and amended, and referrals made to training or
other specific assistance. Since the introduction of the
New Deal programmes, more personalised and intensive
help with job search has begun at six months for the
under-25s through a specialised ‘Gateway’. This is
followed by four compulsory options – subsidised work
placement, full-time education or training, a job
placement in a voluntary organisation, or a placement in a
paid environmental project – for those still unemployed.
In the New Deal for Long-term Unemployed, similar
individual profiling and assistance to the Gateway was
introduced after two years, but the system is gradually
moving to 18 months and 12 months, and full Gateway
services are envisaged in the future. However, the period
of reintensification of job search for this group was not
viewed as significantly different from previous periodic
interventions (Hasluck, 2000a). Voluntary programmes of
full-time training or subsidised job placements that
followed such reintensification period have been poorly
taken up (Hasluck, 2000a).
France, Germany and the Netherlands have all introduced
duration-based interventions for the unemployed in line
with the European Employment Guidelines. In France,
Nouveau Depart interviews will be conducted – for RMI
claimants they are planned to occur after two years of
claiming. Unlike in Britain, other European benefit
systems do not have a fortnightly registration at the public
employment service, operating instead on a three or four-
monthly assessment of job-search activities. German
unemployment policies have also followed this line but
there has been less adoption of general duration-based
intensification measures. However, all unemployed people
are now provided with an in-depth assessment of
problems and needs, and access to active labour market
programmes have been eased. German social assistance
authorities have been incorporating more systematic
appraisal of work search and registration at the Arbeitsamt
(PES). But the underlying approach of the PES offices is
not to enforce job search but to leave it to the claimant.
Large caseloads make more regular interviewing difficult
and there is little to offer the long-term unemployed or
other difficult-to-serve groups besides a subsidised job in
an active labour market programme (OECD, 1996). This
has led some local social assistance authorities to invest in
their own more activating approach – for instance, using
specialised intermediaries as discussed below.
The Netherlands already has compulsory training and
work opportunities for the under-23s. All new claimants
are immediately assessed and profiled according to their
likelihood of getting work and their needs for training.
This comprehensive approach is being extended to all
unemployed people as well as to social assistance cases,
and, to a lesser extent, the disabled, with the aim of
making definite offers of training, work-experience or
subsidised work after 12 months of unemployment.
In the USA, the PES does not have high work focus for
UI claimants. The underlying philosophy of this has been
to leave job search to individual benefit recipients who are
faced with a six-month definite time limit on entitlement.
The provision of assistance and counselling was
historically low, but, since the mid-1990s, there have been
Federal requirements to individually profile the needs of
the unemployed early in their claim and provide better
information and job search assistance. The OECD found
that ‘it would be worthwhile for the PES to consider
examining the registers of job seekers and UI claimants
more frequently and systematically than is currently the
case’ (OECD, 1999b, p. 191). Fifteen weeks of
unemployment is a duration target for access to training
programmes and this triggers some casework intervention.
The contrast with US welfare is stark. Local State welfare
agencies usually have their own employment service with,
for example, advisors, job clubs and work placement
provision (sometimes privatised). Such services are used
both to divert and to provide assistance through
counselling and intervention. Practice varies but work
focus is usually immediate for all claimants, with
exceptions for those with babies (most often under one) or
substantial disability. Most employment service provision
is offered either at the point of claim or within a very
short time. States are experimenting with incorporating
the information side of the PES with welfare’s work-first
approach.
Britain lies between continental Europe and the USA in
the implementation of a stronger work focus. The New
Deal for the under-25s has emphasised both work and
training, and its approach is tempting even Dutch policy
makers to follow suit. French and German programmes
for youth have always been work and training focused and
have relied less on benefits – indeed, there is no social
assistance for the under-25s in France. One main question
is how far British policy for older groups should also
include training or should move to a more work-first
approach. The evidence from the USA of work first’s
efficacy has become less clear as the approach has been
implemented more widely for lone parents. Evidence for a
more mixed approach with short periods of work-focused
training and skills development seems to be growing. A
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job will be the best option for many claimants – especially
those with little or no work experience and those who
have had long periods out of the labour market. The role
of training and education for others must be carefully
considered. If the low-paid, low-skilled end of the labour
market does not give sufficient training and skills to
enable workers to increase their earnings and move up the
career then ‘lifetime learning’ will be a fantasy for them
unless they can have access to training. There is no reason
why this should not be provided when they claim welfare.
Continental social insurance schemes provide such
reskilling in instances of partial disablement and industrial
restructuring. One important aim of policy could be to
design similar schemes with a widened scope to bridge the
gap between unskilled and skilled work.
Individual-centred approach
The US approach to individualised assessment and
programme planning comes in two main forms. First, the
PES has increased the use of individual case profiling,
encouraged by the federal Department of Labor. This
means that claimants for UI are assessed for their risk of
long-term unemployment when they apply and are then
eligible for re-employment services. However, the
effectiveness of such profiling is still largely unknown.
Second, there are moves to individualise intensive work
orientation of welfare provision. But the individual
approach in welfare tends to hinge on what Ellwood calls
helping conundrums (1988), i.e. to provide help is actually
to encourage dependency. For instance, many State
welfare workers will be deliberately deaf to claimants’
descriptions of ‘barriers’ to employment but will want to
see how job search fares in practice. Many States will use
a period of individual job search to both test barriers and
as a condition of entitlement. The push to get claimants to
leave or to divert is also poorly reconciled with
individualised help – many fail the inflow test and get
very poor quality individualised help.
However, at the same time, the individualised caseworker
approach that stands at the centre of the new welfare
system in many States like Wisconsin and signing an
‘employability plan’ or an action plan that stipulates what
will be done to return to work are a central part of the
programme. The Financial and Employment Planner
(FEP) has a role that seeks to be ‘teacher, preacher, friend
and cop’4 and, if the relationship works, then results can
be rewarding for both parties. The move to casework has
also been accompanied by the move towards more
individualised service provision in place of simple cash
assistance – for instance, in the development of child-care
places that suit non-standard working hours. However, the
high unit cost of casework and of a service-rich version of
US welfare is also the product of the financing regime and
it is uncertain how far such a high-cost, individualised
approach could be sustained if rolls began to rise in an
economic recession.
Individual casework at its best tends to be carried out in
the high-quality intermediary organisations that link
welfare claimants to work. America Works, a profit-
making welfare employment service that specialises in
placing welfare claimants in clerical work (see Nye,
1996), uses attitudinal, psychological and social profiling
of all its clients. Why? Because its clients receive the
majority of their funding on completed successful job
placements that have lasted six months. If America Works
did not know what the individual problems and
preferences to work were, it would not be successful. It
estimates that one-third of its trainees require very
detailed personal assistance in order to make a successful
transition into work.5
British welfare to work is dominated by a more flexible
approach to individual needs. Personal advisors are the
pivotal deliverers of all the New Deals and their quality
and the quality of their relationship with claimants have
become crucial factors for success (Hasluck, 2000b). For
the unemployed, this New Deal based approach
supplements the individual Jobseeker’s Contract.
The French were among the originators of individual
contract-based plans as a central part of benefit
entitlement. Such plans d’insertion are supposed to exist
for each and every RMI claimant. This approach has been
widened in recent times to all the unemployed who will be
given a trajectory plan and a caseworker, a consistent
person dealing with their case and providing support and
brokering work. For RMI claimants, this could be a social
worker rather than an Agence National pour l’Emploi
(PES) employment advisor. Social as well as economic
insertion will be considered as a matter of course for RMI
claimants. Both types of personalised intervention focus
on an individually tailored agreement. ANPE-based
trajectory agreements include employment insertion as the
final activity.
The Netherlands uses labour market profiling to place
claimants into four phases according to their distance
4Quoted in Jason de Parle, ‘For caseworkers, helping is a frustrating
experience’, New York Times, 10 December 1999.
5Information from an interview with America Works personnel in
New York, May 1998.
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from the labour market. Individual attention is then
focused on economic integration for those who need it
(that is, claimants in phases 2 and 3, who are estimated to
be able to get back to work with some help with training
or job-search). For those with larger social impediments,
detailed trajectory assistance will be planned before
attempts are made to move them into work.
The German employment services appear to have adopted
the least individualised approaches (except that many
unemployed are effectively left to their own devices).6
The social-work casework approach is returning to social
assistance (Sozialhilfe) but practices vary between
localities. The individual approach means that discretion
is applied to those with barriers to work from child-care
needs. For instance, claimants will be helped to arrange
appropriate and stable child care through local
Kindergarten as part of a return-to-work plan. Hamburg
has greatly increased its supervision and counselling
approach, but has brought in specialised intermediaries to
do re-employment work and to teach workers individual
employment brokering.
The success of personal advisors and their strong
individual focus is a solid foundation for the next stage of
British policy. Evidence from France and from the New
Deal for Long-term Unemployed suggests that the
individual approach works less well when the resources
behind it mean a very restricted choice. The unemployed
are cynical when merely offered more of the same or just
another ‘scheme’ that has no perceived increase in job
prospects (Finn et al., 1998). Evidence from Dutch and
American intermediaries, however, suggests that adding
personalised job brokering and matching services works
well. There may be a need to move away from passive
vacancy matching in Britain. The role of financial
incentives in an individual approach also works well in
private organisations such as America Works and
Maatwerk, but raises the problems of selection and
efficiency in the operation of third-party intermediaries.
The use of third-party intermediaries
The French concept of social exclusion sees the absence
of a direct relationship with state and social insurance
organisations as fundamental to an individual’s social
exclusion. Non-state local organisations have thus been
funded to be entry points to the French welfare state for
the excluded – and for RMIstes and young people
especially. These specialised associations thus act both as
entry points to French social policy and as brokers of
packages of employment, training and social reintegration
programmes. Objective Emploi in St Denis in suburban
north-west Paris is an example of such an organisation
and works in combined offices with Mission Locale for
young people. Community businesses, Enterprises
d’Insertion, that provide social and economic benefits are
also involved – often offering both work placements and
services to unemployed youth or others
The use of intermediaries as brokers is very new in
Germany and has been seized upon by Hamburg and other
north German municipalities as an alternative to the
historical rigidities of federal employment services for
their Sozialhilfe clients. They have purchased services
from a Dutch-based company, Maatwerk, who offer their
services for a fixed fee, and take on claimants and find a
job for them in a small- to medium-sized enterprise. They
base their approach on direct job development and job
matching with a high degree of individual personalised
assistance for the claimant. They guarantee to find a
match between employer and client, and offer follow-up
services to ensure the job is of long standing.
This approach matches the practice of many not-for-profit
and profit-making organisations in the USA that have
evolved since the mid-1970s in response to the Supported
Work initiative for ex-offenders and substance abusers,
and in the 1980s after the abandonment of job creation
programmes such as CETA (Comprehensive Employment
and Training Act). This brought together two approaches:
first, a detailed appreciation of the needs of the hard to
serve and, second, the need to find actual work for
participants rather than rely on job search or general
referral. The US intermediaries almost all have workers –
job developers – who contact potential employers and
build up a database of contacts for job vacancies. The
remainder of the organisation provides training. This can
range from an intensive, two-week, group-based personal
growth and employment orientation session (as provided
by STRIVE), to classroom-based, soft-skill development
and computer skills courses designed to meet the exact
needs of the employer clients (such as in Wildcat Services
Corp.), to actual employment as a trainee during such
training in America Works. These different models reflect
different client groups and funding regimes. America
Works employs its trainees not only to provide a work
environment but also to gain employer subsidies from
welfare to work funds. It obtains its trainees through
referral from welfare offices and by voluntary attendance.
It charges a per-capita fee, but this is weighted so that
6Hamburg Arbeitsamt pointed out that their high caseloads and
benefit administration task limited their ability to involve themselves
heavily in individual cases (March 1998).
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most payment is made on successful placement in work
for three months. STRIVE is a purely voluntary,
participation-based programme but can take referrals.
Wildcat Services has a number of programmes – from
training for New York’s own workfare sites in the City’s
administration, through to high-profile legal and financial
secretarial posts negotiated with famous Wall Street
companies.
Selection is rampant in these organisations, although the
true extent of cream skimming is difficult to assess. First,
those organisations that have self-referral and voluntary
participation will have a more motivated caseload.
Second, many of the programmes are set up to select out
potential poor performers by strict punctuality rules and
other hurdles to continued participation. Many
participants – usually the least employable – drop out or
are asked to leave when they fail. Many fail because they
have a ‘bad attitude’ in some programmes based on
instilling work disciplines and attitudes. Third, all
agencies select trainees within their programmes to match
employer demands. In Wildcat’s case, this means that the
best trained are selected for the Partnership in Industry
scheme and go into the best jobs in Salomon Barclay and
other firms, while the remainder are trained to go into
other clerical jobs or even NYC’s own administration on a
workfare placement (see Chapter 3).
Most of these intermediaries charge employers, but when
doing so can undercut the price of purely private
employment agencies because they have welfare subsidy
of some sort. They also tend to offer follow-up assistance
in the workplace to sort out induction problems.
Employers can save on costly repeated job advertisement
and recruitment procedures. This is particularly true in the
USA where the chronic problem of high turnover in entry-
level jobs has seen a part solution in the employment of
‘welfare moms’ because they tend to have longer retention
than their single/male equivalents. Intermediaries and
others have joined into a federally run Welfare to Work
Partnership that promotes employment of welfare cases,
and advises on tax subsidies and recruitment practices.
Britain has recently recognised the potential of such
intermediaries. The vast majority of New Deal provision
is run by a public agency, the Employment Service, but
with privatised sites as pilots and with voluntary groups
running Gateway services and providing employment
experience. For the New Deal for the Disabled, it was
recognised that specialised experience was to be found in
voluntary groups and charities and these have been funded
to adopt and expand employment-related services.
However, the general nature of Employment Services was
seen not to have the individual-based employer/trainee
advantages of the US-style intermediaries. Evidence from
American good practice was collected (Evans and Kazis,
1999) and a programme of seed funding has been set up.
Britain was not completely sterile ground, however, and
several local voluntary employment projects already
existed – usually in areas previously supported by urban
regeneration.7
The most radical use of intermediaries in Britain has been
the adoption of a fixed-fee placement service with private
providers in the 15 to 20 new Employment Zones
operating since April 2000. All claimants over the age of
25 who have been unemployed for 12 or 18 months or
more (depending on the site) will compulsorily be referred
to the private intermediary who will be given a series of
subsidies that reflect three parts of the reintegration
process. The first is a 13-week intensive period when the
claimant continues to receive their benefit but is assessed
and supported in intensive job search. For the second
period, a maximum of 26 weeks, benefit ceases but the
intermediary is given the equivalent subsidy to 21 weeks’
benefit plus a lump sum that can be spent on any training
or integration work that is agreed between the claimant
and the intermediary. However, the intermediary becomes
responsible for paying the equivalent of benefit to the
claimant and must do so while they remain out of work.
The last subsidy is paid when the claimant has been in
work for 13 weeks and can be paid at any time. Profits are
made for every claimant who enters and retains work at a
net expense that is less than subsidy payments. No results
from these schemes were available at the time of writing.
The Dutch use of intermediaries rose after the Dutch
Government committed itself to an active benefit scheme
and increased funding for training and employment
schemes over the 1990s. The change in policy direction
culminated in consolidation of provision for all long-term
unemployed of 12 months or more in 1998. Reintegration
of the long-term unemployed was effectively privatised.
Intermediaries broker work placements of up to two years
– mostly with private employers. Municipally owned but
separate companies have been set up to distribute
employment subsidies to employers and to provide
placements for the harder-to-serve claimants. Thus, in
Amsterdam, a company called NV Verk Amsterdam is
given the budget for employment-based reintegration, and
it brokers places with employers and distributes the funds.
7Indeed, one in Harlesden in north-west London had already made its
own links to the STRIVE programme in the USA with a view to
incorporating best practice for its own British clients.
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Its original target of providing 10,000 employment places
was reached at the end of 1998. Separately, but also
receiving subsidies from NV Werk Amsterdam is a not-for-
profit organisation called Bureau Maatwerk Amsterdam
that trains and places the hardest to serve (see further
discussion below). Under the CWI regime, these brokers
are used for all long-term unemployed of 12 months or
more, but the private employer-based subsidies and
Bureau Maatwerk Amsterdam tend to be separate
trajectories, with Phase 4 claimants being sent to the latter.
Britain is keen to develop and expand the role of labour-
market intermediaries, and there is the opportunity both to
import successful models from abroad and to encourage
existing policy actors to develop their roles. The danger of
importing off-the-shelf approaches and adapting them to
British conditions is that we may not be in a position to
know how far their success can be copied in a different
policy environment. The alternative approach is to take
themes from foreign success. Such successful themes
appear to be the following:
• active job development and matching to client
caseload
• the ability to be industry specific and to match local
employer needs
• providing training in a work environment by
employing claimants
• strong individual-based approach to casework
• intermediaries offering temporary work providing
public goods.
One difficulty is to set up funding and control
mechanisms that reward good practice but prevent or
dampen cream skimming. One approach could therefore
be to develop intermediaries to deal with the harder-to-
serve groups, and to have employment service referral
rather than voluntary participation.
Lessons from Chapter 2
• Introducing single gateways to benefit and increasing
co-ordination and integration of services bring up
different views on what is efficient and rational
amalgamation of the two sets of strategic interests –
ES and BA. The change will not solve underlying
selection problems and resource allocation in itself.
• The balance between a single gateway that can give
access to service-rich programmes for a wider
selection of claimants and a work-focused entry point
that can emphasise diversion must be carefully
thought through.
• The evidence of the effectiveness of terminating
entitlement as a method of increasing work
participation is mixed. Complete withdrawal of benefits
does not lead to employment for all in the alternative.
• Making tougher rules of entitlement to discourage
entry on to benefits effectively makes many potential
claimants ineligible. The real gains of removing
frictional unemployment from the welfare rolls are
offset by higher incidental poverty. The overall aims
of policy should not reduce the problem to a simple
‘on or off welfare’ choice when access to welfare
could be seen as an opportunity to raise employability
and to break the low-pay no-pay cycle for many
claimants.
• Tough participatory rules and their strict
implementation lower claimant caseload to the extent
that sanction rates in the USA account for around a
quarter of caseload declines since 1996. Sanctioned
exits from welfare are associated with the least skilled
and least educated, and with poor post-welfare
employment histories.
• European approaches are often ‘tougher’ on lone
parents than Britain but are usually predicated on the
actual availability of child care. This has to be
contrasted with the British and to some extent the US
approaches, which are based on individual subsidies
towards the price of child care that usually come into
payment immediately on or after the move into work.
• Extending compulsion to lone parents to move off
should be very carefully approached and, if thought
appropriate, should be accompanied by large
additional expenditure to increase opportunities – not
only to work but also to train and receive child care
simultaneously.
• Britain lies between continental Europe and the USA
in the implementation of a stronger work focus. The
evidence of work first’s efficacy from the USA has
become less clear as the approach has been
implemented more widely for lone parents. Evidence
for a more mixed approach with short periods of
work-focused training and skills development seems
to be growing.
• Continental social insurance schemes provide such
reskilling in instances of partial disablement and
industrial restructuring. One important aim of policy
could be to design similar schemes with a widened
scope to bridge the gap between unskilled and skilled
work.
• Personal advisors and the success of their strong
individual focus is a solid foundation for the next
stage of British policy. Evidence suggests that the
individual approach works less well when the
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resources behind it mean a very restricted choice.
Personalised job brokering and matching services
seem to work. The role of financial incentives in an
individual approach also works well in some foreign
schemes but raises the problems of selection.
• Britain is keen to develop and expand the role of
private and independent providers of welfare to work
programmes and should take more note of successful
themes and models rather than importing specific
providers.
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Chapter 2 has already shown that work, through a
subsidised scheme or a compulsory work obligation, is
often part of an active labour-market policy. There is no
fixed line of demarcation between employment
placements being part of moving someone into work or
giving them a job. Placements look more like permanent
work the longer they last. Practice across the five
countries varies widely in the mix of short-term and long-
term employment in active labour-market programmes.
Provision of actual employment is only one way of
supporting and expanding work opportunities in welfare
to work. The other ways involve reducing the costs of
employment to employers and increasing the real income
from low-paid jobs to the unemployed. In British policy,
the job creation side is currently out of favour. It is left to
good economic management and the right mix of
employment incentives to get the unemployed and
inactive moving into an expanding labour market. We
prefer the policy of ‘making work pay’ to making work.
Other countries see the balance differently, or have a
similar preference but also have a greater commitment to
continuing a significant element of job creation.
Employer subsidies
Reducing the tax and social security burden on entry-level
jobs is both an EU- and an OECD-favoured policy in
order to stimulate jobs growth. In some cases, specific
reductions in social security tax obligations to employers
are targeted on welfare to work policies because they
come with taking on an unemployed or other claimant.
However, in most instances, the overall burden has been
lowered through non-specific fiscal policies aimed at all
entry-level employment.
The French have invested significantly in discounts from
social-security-based, non-wage costs on jobs at or just
above the minimum wage. However, in addition, there is a
range of subsidised placements in work that also attract
specific exemptions from social security costs for
temporary and training positions. Many of these subsidies
have been targeted at youth employment (and hence
mostly outside the claimant reservoir). Contrats
d’apprentissage exempt employers from social security
contributions and give one-off hiring payments. The
1980s saw several forms of short-term and permanent job
schemes in the private sector – Contrats d’Adaptation,
Contrats de Qualification and Contrats d’Orientation –
which all allowed different forms of employment that
gave exemptions from minimum wages, and subsidies in
cash or social security rebates. In the 1990s, minimum-
wage jobs – under Aide au Premier Emploi des Jeunes
and Contrats Initiative Emploi – aimed to provide longer
placements. The unemployment insurance system also
allows benefits to be turned into employer subsidies
through the Conventions de Coopération de l‘Assurance
Chômage where the employer receives a subsidy
calculated at the net rate of benefit received by the
unemployed person for up to a maximum of 12 months.
France has, however, moved increasingly towards more
general subsidies and Figure 12 shows how the balance
between targeted and non-targeted social security subsidies
changed in France over the 1990s. Targeted spending rose in
every year but general subsidies introduced in 1993 grew to
become the majority of such spending by 1997.
France also has a scheme whereby the unemployment
benefits of some claimants can be paid to an employer for
a period after they are hired. This scheme, developed by
UNEDIC and the ASSEDICS through the Conventions de
Coopération de l‘Assurance Chômage, is open only to
private employers who are contributors to the ASSEDIC
and the job must be one that does not attract any other
State subsidies. The unemployed person who is taken on
must have been receiving benefits for more than eight
months and the employer receives a subsidy calculated at
the net rate of benefit received by the unemployed person
for up to a maximum of 12 months. For example, an
unemployed person with 20 months of rights remaining is
hired. Their rate of benefit is FF 200 a day. The employer
will receive 12 months of subsidy.
German employers can pay no social security
contributions on Integration Contracts, short-term ‘trial
jobs’. They are available to the long-term unemployed in
the private sector. Other employers who decide to take on
long-term unemployed workers permanently can claim a
wage cost subsidy of between 50 and 70 per cent of the
average rate of pay. This subsidy is paid out of the annual
budget of the state back-to-work scheme for the long-term
unemployed. The maximum duration of such subsidies is
three years and the subsidy decreases as the unemployed
person remains in the job.
The idea of these short-term work experiences was to
stimulate employers to try out unemployed people without
the risk of offering permanent job contracts, as the
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unemployed person and the employer could end such a
contract at any time without any need to give a reason.
However, the Schroeder government has significantly
changed this initiative on the grounds that weakening
social rights was unjustifiable.
New subsidies are also available in Germany for newly
created enterprises where the Arbeitsamt supports an
initial phase of business development by giving subsidies
for one or two unemployed persons to be employed in the
new enterprise. In Hamburg, these powers were used
2,300 times during the first four months of their operation
from April 1997.
Decentralised and innovative policy practice in Germany
has encouraged each Arbeitsamt to experiment by having
10 per cent of its budget freed for innovative programmes
outside of the strictly prescribed Employment Act
services. In Hamburg, this made 36 million DM available
in 1998, and the local employment services used this
money to support 1,000 business start-ups and 750
disadvantaged young people. In addition, there are
experiments with other employer subsidies. First, there is
a voucher system financed from a mix of state and Federal
funds. Recent amendments to the Employment Promotion
Act have encouraged less rigidity in accessing jobs and
training subsidies, and Hamburg used some of its job
creation funds to create a voucher scheme. These
vouchers can be taken by the unemployed person to a
trainer or employer and are valid for three months, but
they can purchase six months or more of subsidies to the
trainer or employer. Thus, potential ABM (abbreviated
from Arbeitsbeshaffungsmassnahmen) claimants can use
this subsidy to obtain a mix of work and training. These
vouchers are given to caseworkers at the Arbeitsamt to use
as they think fit and they will allocate them to suitable
claimants. The scheme is very experimental. The idea is
that the claimant can approach an employer with funds to
make up for skill shortages and the voucher can help
induction into employment.
German social assistance is also experimenting with
employer subsidies called ‘wage cost support’ and the
Sozialamt can pay direct subsidies based on benefit levels
directly to employers for up to two years when they take
on a claimant. These jobs have to be full time, but there is
no compulsion to train the worker taken on. Experience
has shown, however, that many employers don’t want to
accept such an offer. In Hamburg, there have been only
140 such cases in two years. This form of arrangement has
also been tried experimentally in Hamburg, where the
unemployed have a form of voucher representing their
benefit that can be given to an employer.
Dutch employer subsidies are available for several aspects
of welfare to work policy. First, there is a general subsidy
that is available to reduce the marginal social security tax
costs of jobs that pay between 100 and 115 per cent of the
minimum wage. This subsidy is not time-limited nor
linked to hiring anyone who is unemployed. There is a
further non-specific subsidy at a lower rate for the next
level of waged jobs – between 115 and 130 per cent of the
minimum wage. This subsidy can only be claimed for a
maximum of two years. In addition to these general
subsidies, there is a targeted tax reduction payable for four
years for jobs between 100 and 130 per cent of the
minimum wage that are filled by long-term unemployed.
In July 1998, a further extension to tax subsidies was
made to bring in the disabled claimant population and to
make them more attractive to employ.
Figure 12 French social security rebate spending on job creation in the 1990s
Source: DARES (2000).
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Since 1998, the Netherlands has opened up targeted
employment wage cost subsidies for the unemployed
across the private sector for work experience placements
of up to two years for long-term unemployed (12 months
or more). These provisions supplement the previous
schemes that were based on social employment. Access to
job subsidies is usually through intermediaries who are
distributing the budgets on behalf of unemployment
insurance or social assistance agencies. It is hoped that the
move away from public sector employment will result in
better flows out of subsidised work into unsubsidised
employment. In addition, Dutch policy provides one-off
hiring grants and also imposes a ‘no-risk’ policy for
sickness pay for employers that take on disabled benefit
recipients. If the employer has more than 3 per cent of
their wage bill paid to such employees they can be
exempted from social insurance disability contributions.
Indeed, the most recent changes in Dutch policy regarding
the unemployed have seen a move away from job subsidies
tied to the social sector and towards private employers.
American Federal Tax Credits are available for hiring
TANF ex-welfare and other unemployed and
disadvantaged workers. The $2,400 Work Opportunity
Tax Credit (WOTC) is payable for employees who work a
minimum of 120 hours in a year, and the $8,500 Welfare
to Work Tax Credit (WTWTC) is payable to similar client
groups who work more than 400 hours a year. An
employer cannot claim WOTC and WTWTC for the same
employee and it is only discounted against one year’s
trading profits for tax purposes. There is an overlap with
integration provision and welfare employment where
private providers of such services employ the welfare
claimant as trainees – they too can gain these subsidies.
State schemes also provide for employer subsidies
although take-up has often been lower than expected.
In Britain, national insurance contributions for employers
were reduced for low-paid jobs while targeted employer
subsidies of six months are available only for unemployed
people from the NDYP (New Deal for Young People) and
NDLTU (New Deal for the Long-term Unemployed) in
Britain. Take up has been disappointing – especially in the
public sector, although this was discouraged at the early
stages of implementation – and now funds have been set
aside to third-party intermediaries to provide
employment-based provision.
General and/or targeted subsidies to employers have been
introduced in all five countries. Low take up of targeted
subsidies by employers is a common theme, and evidence
from interviews with employers’ groups and policy
makers suggests that a subsidy is less important to
employers than hiring the right sort of person. An
unemployed person with low skills and little recent work
experience will not usually be hired merely because they
have a subsidy. French commentators spoke of cherry
picking by both employers and ANPE who would sort out
and select the most employable cases. It is doubtful if the
subsidy in these cases gave much additionality above and
beyond the fact that private employers were actually using
ANPE for vacancy filling (estimates are that ANPE has
around only one-third of all French vacancies). It is not
clear how far this experience is shared in the British
experience of the NDYP.
Making work pay
Minimum wages and benefit levels
Minimum wage policies can also help to make work pay.
Britain has now joined the USA, France and Holland in
establishing a national minimum wage. No formal
minimum exists in Germany, although national collective
bargaining agreements lead to industry-specific minimum
wages across the board.
Making work pay can mean expanding and increasing in-
work benefits to the low paid, and this is discussed in
detail below, but can also mean decreasing the value of
benefits. All five countries have reduced benefit
replacement ratios by decreasing the relative generosity of
insurance benefits and/or social assistance. Such policies
have taken place incrementally over a significant period
of the 1980s and 1990s and will not be discussed in detail
here. However, the USA stands out in its long-term trends
in both social assistance rates and minimum wage because
both have fallen in real terms. Figure 13 shows the value
of weekly AFDC benefits for a three-person family and
the gross minimum wage for a 30-hour week from 1979.
The minimum wage has fallen in real terms between 1979
and 1999 – most steeply under Reagan and Bush
presidencies – and then has been raised twice in the
1990s. AFDC benefits – calculated on a weighted state
average for a three-person family – have always been
below the minimum wage for a 30-hour week and fell in
real terms from 1979 to 1996 when AFDC ended. Of
course, some States paid higher rates than this average,
and Food Stamps and housing subsidies could be added to
AFDC to increase their value. But, overall, the US picture
has been to make low pay and out-of-work benefits fall
significantly both in real and relative terms. This policy
had a part, along with rising income differentials in work,
in the growth in income inequality and poverty in the
USA over the period.
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The other country to allow the purchasing value of
minimum wages and social assistance benefits to fall is
the Netherlands, where the 1980s’ social contract on
restraining wages and public spending has led to a
decrease of the minimum wage in real terms and, because
social assistance rates are based on these wage levels, the
level of assistance benefits. However, consequently and,
unlike the US, declines in the real and relative rates of
minimum wages and the social safety net have run in
parallel.
In-work benefits to the low paid
The main growth in policies to ‘make work pay’ has been
in programmes of in-work benefits paid to low-waged
families. These are not necessarily welfare to work
programmes as such because they raise the incomes of
those who are already working as well as those who move
from welfare. Britain has paid low-income families with
children an in-work supplement to low wages since 1971.
The benefits were made significantly more generous in
1988 and again in October 1998. The new benefits also
include an element to offset child-care costs. Delivery of
the benefits has shifted significantly from the benefit to
the tax system. Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) and
Child Care Tax Credit (CCTC) are paid weekly to those
on a low income who have children and work 16 hours a
week or more. Payment is weekly through the pay packet
for all unless a couple specifically asks for it to be paid to
the non-working partner, which many in reality do. The
aim of the benefit is not only to improve incentives to
work but also to combat working poverty and child
poverty more widely and to stimulate employment. In
addition to the basic WFTC and CCTC, there is a
complementary system for disabled people – Disabled
Persons’ Tax Credit. The recent expansion of benefits may
have significant effects on other subsidies for the
provision of public and voluntary run child care, and on
labour market participation of women in couples
(McLaughlin et al., 2001). The British Government has
also begun to discuss an extension of in-work benefits
through tax credits to all low-paid workers (HM Treasury,
2000a). Housing benefits are also available to assist with
local property tax and rents. The high tapers of these
benefits offset much of the help of WFTC for tenants
especially and produce high levels of marginal tax rates.
The other British in-work benefit is for the over-50s
leaving benefits through the New Deal for the over-50s
but this tax-free in-work allowance is transitional and only
lasts for their first year of full-time work.
The British move from benefits to tax credits reflects a
growth in interest in the US Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC), a scheme that pays refundable rebates (that can be
more than tax paid) to low earners when they file taxes at
the end of each tax year. The Clinton Administration
raised EITC levels considerably and extended eligibility.
While the tenth percentile of US earnings rose by 6 to 7
per cent between 1993 and 1999, maximum EITC
eligibility rose by 153 per cent over the same period
(Primus, 2000). Some individual States also have their
own income tax credit schemes. EITC is paid at the end of
the tax year and is thus less effective in lifting transitional
income at the step change between benefits and work.
States have therefore increasingly moved to alter TANF
benefit withdrawal rates so that benefits can continue to
be paid to support low-paid work. States also have an
incentive to do this in order to meet the work participation
targets set by TANF block grants. The problem with such
Figure 13 The falling real value of US social assistance and minimum wages
Source: Author’s calculations from DHHS (1998).
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schemes is that, in most States, such payments count
when calculating time limits for welfare receipt
(Greenberg, 2000). This means that families can
participate in work, receive benefits to support such
activity but then have these benefits cut when time limits
come into force.
The USA has also increased health- and child-care
benefits for low-income families. These schemes tended
to be transitional schemes in the early 1990s but have,
with TANF and other Federal funds, slowly expanded into
more generic and long-lasting subsidies to low-paid work
for both welfare leavers and, less so, for other poor
workers with children. However, one of the main stories
that have accompanied welfare reform is the poor take up
of in-work benefits. Part of the problem is that take up of
means-tested, in-work benefits in the USA has always
been poor – around 42 per cent of eligible families in
recent years (Zedlewski and Brauner, 1999). Changes in
eligibility introduced by Welfare Reform laws in 1996
have also had an impact – and administrative hassle is the
second most prevalent non-income-based reason for
leaving the programme (Zedlewski and Brauner, 1999).
However, take up by TANF leavers was worse than for
other groups and the position was worst for the poorest
TANF leavers: ‘For those with incomes below 50% of the
poverty level, former welfare families stopped using food
stamps at twice the rate of nonwelfare families (45%
versus 23%)’ (Zedlewski and Brauner, 1999, p. 2). Under
Federal rules, Medicaid is supposed to continue for
between six and 12 months for those who leave welfare
and are earning, but surveys show that only just over 50
per cent still have coverage six months after they have
left. Medicaid entitlement after 12 months off welfare is
available under a complex mixture of Federal and State
schemes, but evidence shows that less than one-quarter
continue to receive Medicaid and around one-half have no
health insurance at all (Garrett and Holahan, 2000).
Child-care provision was consolidated and expanded by
US welfare reform – although States’ arrangements for
provision and access to child care and subsidies to pay for
it remain fragmented in the majority (Long et al., 1998).
Despite huge increases in Federal and State funds for
child care, estimates are that only 10 per cent of children
eligible for subsidies receive them and only around 30 per
cent of families leaving welfare for work receive subsidies
for child care (DHHS, 2000).
A major problem for the delivery of in-work benefits in
the US is that welfare offices are often no longer
adequately set up to provide benefit services as an
alternative to welfare because they have moved to a work-
first model (see discussion above). A further problem in
the USA is that the interaction of State and Federal in-
work benefits and tax credits produces high marginal tax
rates. The situation differs widely across the USA but, in
Wisconsin, where the State had opted for high levels of
in-work support, the withdrawal rate at the margins of the
poverty line exceed 100 per cent – a severe poverty trap
for families with children who have earnings in the region
of $16,000 a year.
Continental Europe has historically sought to make work
pay for individual employees using the combination of
minimum wages, universal family allowances and,
especially in France, pro-family tax systems. France also
stands out in having universal all-day nursery provision –
and hence child care – that takes all three year olds. The
French income tax system takes many families with
children out of such tax liability altogether and can be
seen as a corollary to in-work benefits. The French have
improved incentive structures at the margins of social
assistance and work by amending the rules for RMI, API
to allow part-time working while on benefits. Germany
has seen less change but at the time of writing is
experimenting with an in-work benefit. However, the
Netherlands has taken tax and benefit incentives very
seriously and has already amended the tax allowances for
low-paid work to lessen high marginal tax rates. This,
however, has meant that many part-time jobs have been
created at wages just below the ceiling. This erosion of the
tax base and other problems have led to a radical plan to
move towards a tax credit system in an overhaul of the
income tax system in 2001. All tax allowances will be
replaced by individualised tax credits which will assist in
incentives to move from benefits to work for both single
people and couples by lowering replacement rates across
the board. (OECD, 2000a).
Making work pay through in-work benefits targeted at
low-income families can lift incomes at the margins of
out-of-work benefits and work, and increase incentives to
move into work. All five countries have some forms of
benefit for either smoothing transitions into work and/or
supporting low pay. Such policy can be seen as the
‘carrot’ in welfare to work programmes when compared to
the ‘sticks’ outlined in Chapter 2 that made entitlement to
welfare more conditional. However, such programmes are
not limited to those who have made the transition into
work and must also be viewed as anti-poverty
programmes for the low paid. The relationship between
‘stick’ and ‘carrot’ is an important one and growing
evidence from the USA seems to suggest that combining a
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strong anti-welfare agenda with a ‘making work pay’
strategy has had detrimental effects on the take up of
important in-work benefits such as Food Stamps and
Medicaid. This is an area of evidence that Britain must
take seriously in the future if we want to move towards an
individualised, service-rich environment that also has very
strong messages about compulsion and obligations.
Take up of in-work benefits that are means-tested is a
problem – although evidence of US take-up problems of
EITC tends to suggest over-claiming. Moves to harmonise
tax and social security and an expansion of tax credits in
the UK and the Netherlands may provide the ability to
ensure close to 100 per cent take up for families with
children if receipt of a universal child benefit/family
allowance is used in conjunction with earnings and tax
data.
Providing work
The line between providing work and subsidising
employers is also not an easy one to draw, but one
difference is where the employer is a public or publicly
funded organisation.
There is currently a turnaround in US practice and debate
on job creation, or rather community employment as an
element in welfare to work programmes. The CETA
(Comprehensive Employment and Training Act)
programmes of the 1970s provided employment in poor
urban areas of the USA and were widely criticised as
being ineffectual and corrupt. Public employment
programmes moved towards training with attached labour
market placement programmes where many providers use
active job development – active enrolment of employers
to meet their needs and to match them to participants’
profiles – as an alternative. In the 1980s, the only other
experiment with welfare jobs was workfare. Workfare is a
term that is often misused or inexactly applied as a
generalisation for all compulsory work-focused benefit
rules. In its original and most precise meaning, it refers to
the US practice of making AFDC and GA claimants work
a given number of hours for their benefits. Such schemes
came to policy prominence under Reagan’s Governorship
of California in the late 1970s, but when exposed to
experimental evaluation they were found to be costly and
to have poor outcomes (Goldman et al., 1986).
One of the ironies of the 1996 PRWORA reforms is that
they allow States for the first time to use social assistance
funds to create actual jobs rather than workfare schemes
(Savner and Greenberg, 1997). This opportunity has
increasingly been taken up in US cities because of
geographical job mismatches and to meet the needs of an
increasingly hard-to-serve population left on welfare as
the booming economy draws the most employable into
work. An employment-centred approach has the
advantage over workfare of drawing down Federal in-
work benefits such as EITC. These newly emerging
‘community jobs programs’ offer temporary real jobs
providing community needs and look a lot like the British
Intermediate Labour Market (see below) – except that the
US model operates in a mandatory environment.
Workfare, however, has not disappeared. Indeed, New
York City in the 1990s has seen the implementation of a
huge municipal workfare scheme with around 36,000
workfare placements. The Work Experience Program
(WEP) was introduced primarily for the GA population
and extended to TANF claimants as part of their work
participation requirements. However, New York’s
workfare programme has a very distinct history that has
emphasised municipal work. The huge structural fiscal
problems of New York in the early 1990s (Fuchs, 1996;
Gyourko and Summers, 1998) led to public service
efficiency measures and lower staffing levels in many
services. The introduction of WEP into parks, hospitals,
central services other NYC areas and the welfare
department itself has therefore been seen by some as
replacing paid employment places with ‘unpaid’ workfare:
We had to make cuts... When we did what was
necessary, there were services that were under-
attended and we had people receiving taxpayers’
money, who were able to do that work. How could
anyone criticize us for developing a program that
meets so many needs? (Mayor Giuliani in a radio
interview, quoted by the New York City Workfare
website [http://www.igc.apc.org/ny@work/])
For example, the City’s Parks and Recreation
Department’s workforce fell by 28 per cent between 1993
and 1996, but the introduction of hundreds of WEP
participants has simultaneously occurred. The result has
been a huge improvement in the cleanliness ratings – up
from 61 to 95 per cent acceptable and there is no
argument that workfare is a primary factor.
The biggest contributor to the improved cleanliness
of New York City’s parks has been the workfare
program … By the fall of 1997, more than 6,000
able-bodied welfare recipients, men and women,
were working approximately 21 hours a week in
parks, helping to paint benches, shovel snow, rake
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leaves and pick up litter in exchange for their
benefits. (City of New York Parks and Recreation
Department, 1998, p. 1)
The City denies direct replacement of workers with
workfare – and the politics of the move are hotly
contested. Union acquiescence decreased in the late
1990s.
Overall, WEP has not performed well as a welfare to work
measure but generates a large volume of administrative
and behavioural sanctions that help to lower the rolls and
tend to reinforce WEP’s role in deterring and controlling
claimants rather than their improving their employability.
In 1996, HRA records showed that 5 per cent had found
jobs. Without access to supplementary education and
training provision, WEP tends to decrease job search
because most placements take up the mornings of every
weekday. The benefits of New York’s WEP are mostly
going to local taxpayers in the form of unquantified
improvements in public goods and services rather than to
the participants themselves.
But New York has not been able to remain out of step
with the growing surge of community job provision.
Despite the stiff opposition by the Mayor and City
Welfare Department, New York agreed in mid-2000 to
implement a Transitional Jobs Program of 7,500 12-month
jobs paying $7.50 an hour, which also provide for eight
hours training a week.
Continental Europe has had a much longer and larger
commitment to job creation in the social sector. France
developed short-term contracts in public organisations for
young people and the long-term unemployed in the
Contrats Emploi Solidarité (CES) in 1990 providing part-
time jobs, usually for three to 12 months. Wages are a
proportion of the minimum wage (SMIC) and 95 per cent
of the wage costs are paid from central funds, with
employers facing no social security taxes. Longer-term
positions were then established in Contrats Emploi
Consolidé – jobs of 30 hours a week and paid at 120 per
cent of the minimum wage – to follow on from a CES for
up to a maximum of five years.
In 1997, the French Government decided to expand public
job creation even further for young people and create
300,000 new jobs to provide public goods services that
were currently unmet – in schools, police, social housing
estates and elsewhere. The need for such jobs arose
because many young people leaving CES and other short-
term initiatives remained unemployed – their experience
in these schemes was not seen as adequate to be
employable in the private sector. At the same time, entry-
level private jobs were being taken by more qualified
graduates, who found it difficult to move on and free these
jobs for the less qualified. Emploi Jeunes positions are
thus aimed at both secondary and university qualified
under-25s who are unemployed in order to offer both
better-quality job experience and the basis for a
permanent job providing a new public service. The jobs
are for five years and are set up to stimulate funding for
their continuation after this time.
The Emploi Jeunes scheme is primarily aimed at those
who have no work record – including graduates aged up
to 30 – but mainly the under-25s. The State pays 80 per
cent of Emploi Jeunes participants’ wages and employers
are supposed to give the remaining 20 per cent to reach
SMIC wage levels. This means a central subsidy of FF
92,000 a year. Globally, the State budget provided FF 9.2
billions for 150,000 jobs for 1997 to1998. At the moment,
Emploi Jeunes participants may be used only by local
public institutions and non-profit-making companies
(charities, associations, workers’ councils, etc.). However,
there is a very specific exception for private companies
directly performing public services. Central State civil
service departments are not allowed to directly employ
Emploi Jeunes participants. The aim is to develop jobs to
fulfil new or unsatisfied needs, and to provide the basis
for these jobs to become permanent in the longer term.
There is a ban on job substitution and each position has to
be proven as a new post. For instance, a local Saint Denis
hospital with a vacancy for an archivist wanted to fill it
though hiring an Emploi Jeunes participant, but could not.
Enforcement of this no-substitution rule is by ANPE.
Teaching assistants and information officers in schools
and colleges have been a major source of positions.
However, the rapid implementation of the scheme in the
education sector has not ensured the provision of adequate
training to accompany the positions in many instances
(Blanchard, 1998). Within one year, 63,000 jobs were
created in this way with the majority in the education
sector (DARES, 1999).
Other positions have to be developed by communities and
public sector – in Saint Denis the scheme meant that a
plan to produce 80 posts was agreed in October 1997.
This was the first part of a rolling plan that envisaged 400
places in the longer term. Job development is now a major
part of producing a plan to expand, and Objectif Emploi,
the local agency described as the main administrators of
RMI, are central to this work. Pre-recruitment courses and
information sessions aim to bring the scheme to the
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attention of the 40 per cent of Saint Denis youth who
knew nothing about it in early 1998.8
German job creation has two separate sources – the
Federal unemployment system and local municipal social
assistance. Federal unemployment funds have been
available for job creation in the third sector (i.e. to avoid
substitution). The ABM (abbreviated from
Arbeitsbeshaffungsmassnahmen) projects provide fixed-
term temporary jobs jointly financed by the Federal
Employment and the Länder that draw up the local
programme of job creation. Federal funds tend to finance
the wages for the job and the Länder the non-wage costs –
around 25 per cent of the gross cost. To qualify, one must
be unemployed for at least 12 months. Recent changes to
eligibility have stressed the harder to serve rather than just
the long-term unemployed. Particular to Hamburg is a
system of education and qualification that accompanies
the ABM schemes. Participants have 20 per cent of their
work time set aside for training and qualification, and
each work placement must agree an element of training
and qualification. In recent years, ABM schemes have
been redirected at the unemployed with chronic illness
and disability.
Running in parallel but solely directed at social assistance
claimants are agencies that put into practice the principles
of Hilfe zur Arbeit – help though work and work
experience. Beschäftigungsgesellschaften (community
businesses) are often the organisations that put this
principle of social assistance into practice. Hamburg’s
HAB is one such organisation and actually produces
goods or services and hence the claimants become
workers and trainees in a variety of workplace
assignments. These could range from metal-craft
workshops to a hotel but all are a response to social needs
and should not substitute private employment. The
company trades as a normal business and has to win
contracts for its goods and services, but is subsidised by
the municipality. Training is provided both in-house for
work-floor and on-the-job skills, and by outside trainers.
The Netherlands has had several waves of public
employment programmes for the unemployed. The first
two waves in the mid-1990s were named after the
Minister for Employment and Social Welfare – the so-
called Melkert jobs. Recent changes have moved to create
more temporary transitional positions that can either act as
a stepping stone to an unsubsidised job or be taken over
and fully funded from alternative sources. In going in this
direction, policy on employment creation has moved from
public and social jobs towards a more rounded, market-led
approach as stated above. Municipalities, and particularly
the major cities, have set up publicly funded companies to
act as employment pools. These companies operate as a
system of Bahnenpool employing social assistance
claimants themselves, providing training and then placing
them in work. As with the US intermediary model, there is
a large emphasis on job development and one part of the
organisation is looking for employment opportunities –
especially in areas where public goods employment can
be subsidised by the underlying welfare budget of their
employees. For instance, the local hospital car park in
Amsterdam was not safe and patients’ and staff’s cars
were being vandalised or stolen. The Bahnenpool was
approached and created security officer jobs for the
hospital, provided the staff and employed them and
charged for the service. The position of such jobs is then
reviewed and the potential for a permanent position and
its financing assessed. The emphasis on temporary and
transitional employment has increased in recent years and
more efforts are now made to move participants on to the
normal labour market. Pay is the minimum wage and the
employees continue to be asked to job search.
British provision of work is limited to the NDYP – either
in voluntary organisations or in locally run Environmental
Task Forces. However, much of this employment is not
based on wages but on benefit replacement with a small
increase in rates. Other British employment provision has
been aligned to local provision. Such schemes usually
come under the name of Intermediate Labour Markets
(ILMs). ILMs are local organisations – usually assisted by
urban regeneration funds and the European Social Fund –
that create socially useful, real jobs for long-term
unemployed people and other claimants. ILMs came to
prominence in the mid-1990s during discussions of the
future of work and the possibility of moving towards
workfare-type provisions such as Project Work introduced
by the Conservative Major Government. A broad
spectrum of opinion on the Left was in favour of social
employment schemes as an alternative to workfare and
ILMs such as Glasgow Works provided examples of well-
run schemes that offered insulation, community advice
and assistance, and other work experience for the
unemployed in areas of high unemployment (McGregor et
al., 1997). A national expansion of community
employment was put forward by the left-leaning Institute
of Public Policy Research (Holtham and Mayhew, 1996).
The incoming Blair Government gave a boost to ILMs in
the six original areas for Employment Zones and the
Environmental Task Force for the NDYP has employed
ILMs in some areas. However, having invested in setting8Le Journal Objectif Emploi, No. 1, February 1998.
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up Employment Zone ILM projects, the Government
abruptly cancelled all further recruitment to them when it
announced the new regime for these Zones (no longer
based on community employment) – described in Chapter 2.
The change of heart by the Government reflected central
civil servants’ opinions that such schemes had high costs
and relatively low outcomes when compared to the range
of interview-based interventions that had evolved within
the Employment Service during the 1980s and 1990s
(such as Restart, One-to-one and others – see Gardiner,
1997 for an overview). Not only did ILMs have high unit
costs but they also fell foul of an apparent ideological
opposition to job-creation schemes within New Labour
and were further thwarted by the argument over ‘job gaps’
in specific geographical areas of the UK (discussed
further in Chapter 4). Evidence on the efficacy of the
community job approach is available from both the US
(Johnson and Carricchi-Lopez, 1997) and elsewhere in
Europe (Disney and Carruth, 1992). Evaluation of ILMs,
such as Glasgow Works, are difficult to compare with
other UK evaluation data because the schemes are
voluntary and in particular locations but there is evidence
of very good job retention for participants who move into
normal employment (Cambridge Policy Consultants,
1998).
The role of employment-based welfare to work
programmes for the unemployed is disputed by British
policy makers although recent announcements about the
future of the New Deals seem to suggest that an expanded
role for ILMs may be foreseen for the hardest to serve –
and in particular those with chronic illness or disability
(HM Treasury, 2000b). The reluctance of policy makers is
understandable but there is evidence that the approach can
work if structured well. The lessons from abroad seem to
suggest that employment-based programmes should:
• be targeted on people who have poor work experience
and who are difficult to place in work
• be emphasised in geographical areas where the ratio
of vacancies to claimants is poor – as in the instances
in the inner cores of many US cities
• provide social goods which, where possible, should
be measured as an outcome of the programme and
hence be included in cost-benefit analysis alongside
the programme’s ability to prepare and move
claimants into work
• provide temporary placements not permanent jobs
and therefore incorporate a central aim of preparing
and assisting their workforce to move into the regular
labour market
• provide real paid work experience that will be valued
by other employers
• avoid substitution and fulfil unmet job needs – there
is no reason why temporary employment programmes
should not provide marketed goods or services but,
where these goods and services develop into a viable
business, such employment programmes should be
encouraged and allowed to become normal
businesses.
The Dutch experience of using subsidies in a global
budget for a particular geographical area – to support
employers’ needs and to create new temporary
employment schemes – could be investigated further in a
potential return to the original ideas behind Employment
Zones – perhaps through geographically targeted
programmes like the Single Regeneration Budget or
Neighbourhood Renewal Strategy.
There are, of course, negative lessons as well. The
German social assistance jobs are often a means to give
people a work record and hence shift financial
responsibility for them away from local and on to Federal
social insurance budgets. Many European job schemes
have not had adequate flow-through objectives – they
have been compromises between the different policy
actors to ‘do something about unemployment’ rather than
to set up viable temporary jobs that stimulated both the
individual and the local social economy. Similarly, some
of the rules about substitution employed abroad do not
make much common sense – in Germany, ABMs can
operate commercially only in the voluntary and church
sectors, which means an ABM building project can fix the
roof of a church but not, say, a public building.
Lessons from work and work subsidies
• General and/or targeted subsidies to employers have
been introduced in all five countries. Employer take
up of targeted subsidies is a common problem and
evidence suggests that a subsidy is less important to
employers than hiring the right sort of person. This
suggests that employment subsidies tend not to be
effective with harder-to-serve groups and have a
tendency to support cherry picking.
• Making work pay through in-work benefits targeted
at low-income families is present in all five countries
for either smoothing transitions into work and/or
supporting low pay.
• Programmes are not limited to those who have made
the transition into work and must also be viewed as
anti-poverty programmes for the low paid.
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• Evidence from the USA of deteriorating take up of in-
work benefits suggests that combining a strong anti-
welfare agenda with a ‘making work pay’ policy in a
single organisation (the welfare office) has had
detrimental effects on the take up of in-work benefits.
This is an area of evidence that Britain must take
seriously in the future if we want to move towards an
individualised, service-rich environment that also has
very strong messages about compulsion and
obligations.
• Take up of means-tested, in-work benefits is a more
general problem. Moves to harmonise tax and social
security and an expansion of tax credits in the UK
and the Netherlands may provide the ability to ensure
close to 100 per cent take up for families with
children if receipt of a universal child benefit/family
allowance is used in conjunction with earnings and
tax data.
• Temporary employment-based welfare to work
programmes can work if structured well, and should
be expanded in Britain and targeted on hard-to-serve
populations and in areas of high unemployment.
• The Dutch experience of using subsidies in a global
budget for a particular geographical area – to support
employers’ needs and to create new temporary
employment schemes – could be investigated further
in a potential return to the original ideas behind
Employment Zones, perhaps through geographically
targeted programmes like the Single Regeneration
Budget or Neighbourhood Renewal Strategy.
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What works and why: US evidence in a
European context
Britain is hungry for evidence-based policy to answer the
question ‘what works?’ The most consistent answer to
what works in welfare to work is an underlying healthy
growing economy with job growth. Even in a booming
economy, deciding what contribution is made by welfare
to work programmes is difficult. The most recent US
estimates suggest that their 1996 reforms had a significant
effect in reducing caseloads above and beyond the effects
of the economy (Council of Economic Advisors, 1999).
This fact puts the USA potentially high on the list of
countries to learn from, but does this mean that it is a
reliable example of what works, and should its approach
be followed?
The temptation to follow US policy is understandable and,
given Britain’s clear lead in European discussions on
unemployment policy, lessons from Europe are more
difficult to see as relevant. Evidence from Europe is also
less available and clear-cut – the role of independent
evaluation of policy is less well established than in the
USA. European social insurance systems often have to
compromise on policy aims and implementation in order
to please employers, unions and the State. Britain and the
USA are clearly different in their ability to change
entitlement rules easily with less protracted political
negotiations – although Britain seemingly has more
ability to easily change social insurance provisions than
the USA. Conversely, the USA has been able to change
social assistance radically and with strongly resonant
rhetorical themes such as ‘ending welfare as we know it’.
While Britain has adopted much of the rhetoric, we have
not been so radical and have held back from imposing the
full panoply of tough policy changes outlined in Chapters
1 to 3.
Britain is currently at a point of policy reflection about
what to do next with its welfare to work programmes. We
have met important targets such as placing 250,000 young
people into jobs and attention is moving away from the
unemployed towards lone parents and sick and disabled
claimants. We have a growing body of evidence about
what has worked so far. But next to American declines in
welfare claimant caseloads, our successes look less rosy.
For this reason, this section turns its attention almost
exclusively to the American evidence of the effects of its
welfare reform.
American experience of welfare reform
US changes in policy have been a decisive factor in
caseload decline, but does this mean that it is a successful
welfare to work policy? The headlines of US welfare, of
caseload decline combined with higher employment rates
for lone parents, are attractive.
US welfare receipt is now far more work-based than
before. Employment rates of continued claimants have
risen greatly – from 11 per cent in 1996 to 33 per cent in
1999. More claimants are leaving welfare and many are
working but their employment position is not necessarily
secure – 62 to 75 per cent work at some point in the first
12 months after leaving welfare but only 36 per cent are in
employment 12 months after they have left (DHHS,
2000). Evidence on these welfare leavers from States’
surveys and from other surveys show that around 20 per
cent of leavers are not actually in work and furthermore
have no evidence of income. There is a 30 per cent
recidivism rate of returning to claim welfare. On the
whole, US welfare leavers do not have secure or sufficient
income. Only one-third of Wisconsin’s welfare leavers are
above the poverty level and the majority of States’ studies
of leavers show that most leavers are either financially the
same or worse off than they were on welfare (Brauner and
Loprest, 1999; Loprest, 1999).
The impact of welfare reform in decreasing poverty is
mixed. Evidence from US national income profiles shows
that the poorest quintile of lone mothers suffered a decline
in real incomes since welfare reform – having previously
shown low but modest increases in income up to that
point. The majority of this lost income is explained by the
disappearance of means-tested benefits (Primus et al.,
1999). This degradation of the safety net has had knock-
on effects on child poverty. While child poverty rates have
declined from 16 to 14 per cent overall, the net per capita
poverty gap (after taxes and benefits) for children has
grown in real terms by 9 per cent between 1995 and 1998
(Primus, 2000).
Behind the headlines of falling caseloads and rising
employment rates there are considerable numbers of
‘losers’ and many of the gains to income that are made by
moving from welfare into work are marginal to the extent
that a significant proportion of work gainers are income
losers. Yet, the US policy environment does not seem to
consider losers as a policy issue of any seriousness.
Falling rolls and rising rates of employment are mostly
4␣ ␣ Best practice and lessons for British policy
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portrayed as an unqualified success (see, for instance,
DHHS, 2000 and contrast with Primus et al., 1999). Those
claimants who leave welfare and do not work or do not
‘succeed’ have even less legitimacy than those claimants
who remain on welfare. Those who join the working poor
mostly do so at the bottom end of an extensive insecure
labour market that has high levels of turnover and poor
conditions. The high-profile gainers – the single moms on
welfare who go to work at Salomon Barclay and get to go
to the White House as an icon of welfare reform – are a
small part of the story.
The truth from the USA is that there are many good and
bad things to learn but that learning the bad things
requires a critical approach. Such an approach is not
limited to careful handling of policy advocates when they
cross the Atlantic to spread the news. It also applies to the
growing academic literature from experimental
evaluations of US programmes that are admired by the
Treasury and others in the UK. The methodology and
approach of the social scientists involved is usually first
class but the presentation of their results is geared to an
American policy-making audience who may well want a
story of what works in simple terms. British policy
makers want to know about the pain as well as the gain
and would be puzzled by the general limitation of such
experimental results to their aggregate effects. If we are
properly to utilise US evaluations, we need to invest more
in secondary analysis of their results so that their data are
broken down sufficiently to allow the British reader to
understand how many lost, who they were and by how
much, as well as the aggregate gains to incomes and falls
in spending on welfare. This should then be put alongside
evidence of the secondary effects on the families and
others that support those who lose welfare and who rely
on them instead. If we are told what works but have no
real idea of why it works or its costs in poverty and social
exclusion, how can we try to replicate it outside of the
experimental context – and especially across the Atlantic
Ocean?
There is a further lesson about the applicability of US
research even to its own programmes. The AFDC
experiments of the 1980s and early 1990s were often not
done on a full lone-parent caseload. For instance, the
GAIN evaluations were only for those who were
mandatorily assigned to employment programmes – those
without children under six and without disability. The fact
that the results from this experiment were expanded to
cover the whole AFDC/TANF population is an important
point to remember in both the applicability of research to
policy and as a point of reservation when it comes to
heralding America’s commitment to ‘evidence-based
policy’. We have to understand the relationship between
good quality social science and a poor quality policy-
making environment in the USA at present.
Recent US evidence has shown the benefits of a flexible
and mixed programme for moving lone parents into work.
The Portland (Oregon) scheme that emphasised quality
transitions into work, assisted in setting up child care, and
gave the opportunity to train or look for work as the first
step to moving into work has had the best results of the 11
sites in most recent National US evaluations (Freedman et
al., 2000). There appears to be a growing but uneven US
trend to move away from simplistic models of ‘work first’
and a diversion towards bringing down the rolls and
towards a greater investment in service delivery.
Integrated packages: best practice and
suggestions for Britain
The evaluation of British labour market programmes for
the unemployed has existed in an environment where
many of those with the greatest barriers to work have been
outside of the study group – lone parents and people with
illness and disabilities in particular. Selection and sorting
of claimants in Britain for welfare to work programmes
has mostly been on the basis of unemployment duration
prior to 1997 – and, indeed, this still forms the single most
important factor in delivering the mainstream of active
labour market programmes. There is a move in other
European countries towards a duration-based approach
that will give assistance to all unemployed before they
become long-term absentees from the labour market as
part of EU employment policy.
How will Britain adapt to its redefined and wider range of
claimants for future welfare to work programmes? Britain
is merging the Benefits Agency and the Employment
Service to become a new single agency for working-age
people that will prioritise work and training, but how will
those with most barriers to work compete for resources in
an organisation where the active labour market ethos has
never had to consider them before? What worked in the
past may not work so well without some expansion and
adaptation. We know how to turn around the frictionally
unemployed most efficiently. The USA provides us with
evidence of how to divert frictionally unemployed lone
parents and limit their recourse to welfare.
Britain at present really only offers a service-rich
programme to the unemployed – and then again mostly to
the under-25s. If Britain is going to move away from a
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categorical targeting of services on the unemployed
towards one based on ‘equality of opportunity’ then it will
probably have to put to one side the categorical divisions
between the New Deals and move to an approach that cuts
across claimants of all types and focuses instead on
opportunities and barriers to work. This would mean that
a lone parent or disabled claimant who had poor
qualifications would be more likely to be treated as
someone who needed training rather than as a member of
a secondary claimant reservoir who may be persuaded to
move into work.
However, the analysis so far has tended to look at specific
programmes or particular methods. As unemployment
levels fall and the long-term stocks of claimants have
greater barriers to work then there is the need to consider
more mixed packages of intervention that deliver different
types of assistance to improve employability, move people
into work and support them in work. From all five
countries studied in this report, there are instances of good
practice and of potentially useful interventions that
provide mixed packages. These examples of mixed
packages are described under four themes:
• induction and assessment of employability
• provision of education and training
• employment and temporary employment
• in-work support.
Induction and assessment of employability
There are strong arguments for letting the labour market
decide who does and who doesn’t need help by holding
back services to those who are found to experience
problems in getting a job. This approach avoids
deadweight, helping those who would have found work
without help. However, there is also a fundamental
unfairness in encouraging those with substantial barriers
to work to fail at job search and thus become less
motivated before giving them help that was foreseeable.
Individual profiling of claimants and their experience and
needs, and thus predicting potential long-term
unemployment, is a contentious area and there is much
experimentation in the USA in the unemployment
insurance population with rather mixed results to date.
Such an approach could have a significant impact on
initial assessments at the point of inflow into benefits and
the timing of targeting of programmes in Britain. More
importantly for British policy, there is a strong
organisational culture within ES and DfEE that sees
duration-based targeting as cost-effective and efficient.
However, this approach has relied on having a population
that was unequivocally engaged in job search and ready to
move into work at short notice. This isn’t necessarily the
case with lone parents and disabled claimants. Personal
advisors who currently support and identify barriers to
work could have their role enhanced to be brokers for a
wider range of services that respond to and remedy
barriers that are identified.
This may require a more highly trained and structured
approach, and lessons could be drawn from some of the
successful US intermediaries dealing with lone parents
who do in-depth qualitative work on barriers. For
instance, America Works (AW), which operates as a
private for-profit company, invests a great deal in
profiling because it relies on good-quality, long-lasting
job placements to make money. It gives an in-depth
assessment of all applicants’ psychosocial stability as well
as the standard assessments of human capital and job-
readiness. It considers the claimant’s housing,
relationships and neighbourhood problems and profiles
crucial to their potential success and not just their work
experience, skills, welfare history and verbal proficiency.
AW is dismissive of US bureaucratic assessments of
employability and job readiness because they rarely
establish a trusting relationship with the claimant and
focus too much on someone’s wage potential rather than
on whether they can succeed in work.
The issue of child care is central to lone parent
participation. For instance, AW also ensures that the
individuals’ needs for child care are met as a part of
induction and preparation. It views this as a ‘training
exercise’ during which its lone mothers are given
information on quality and sustainability of child care and
practice on how to negotiate sustainable arrangements. A
simpler version of this principle in the French, Dutch and
German approaches to lone parent participation in work
actually ensures the child-care issue is settled before
providing employment and training services.
Provision of education and training
The need for basic education, further and more applied
education, and soft and hard skills is a complex one that
needs to respond to a range of underlying issues.
However, in the hard-to-serve populations, there will be
significant numbers of claimants who lack both work
experience and soft and hard skills. One method of
providing a mixture of work experience and training is to
link training directly to the needs of employers by having
a single organisation train and place claimants. The
intermediaries simultaneously reach out to employers to
develop job opportunities for their trainees. The
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combination of training and active job development and
placement is very different from the ES approach of
mainly passive vacancy collection. The job development
role ensures that the trainees are given skills that are
directly relevant to employers’ needs. For instance,
Wildcat Service Corporation in New York City provides
education, vocational training, job placement and job
retention services to these groups and to the long-term
unemployed to meet its mission, ‘to act as the program of
last resort for chronically unemployed individuals with
limited work histories and little or no job skills’. Wildcat’s
trainees remain on benefits but other agencies actually
employ claimants on a part-time contract and treat them as
employees while they train them. America Works operates
like this as does Maatwerk Amsterdam – a not-for-profit
public employment project in Holland. The employment
approach means that training is accompanied by the
experience of being in a work-like environment,
emphasising the need for punctuality, good personal
presentation and dress. It also allows both the employer
and employee to draw down their relevant subsidies. This
has the added value of setting up these subsidies and
ensuring they are paid while the transition to an
independent job is occurring. Then, when the trainee has
to move to their new employer, the intermediary can assist
in subsidy transfer as part of the induction and support
they give when the trainee begins the new job.
Employment and temporary employment
As previously discussed, the role of transitional
employment in welfare to work in Britain has been tainted
with the accusation of high costs and poor outflows into
work and of ‘make work’ or non-relevant job creation.
Policy makers are often caught between the problem of
providing good enough quality of work experience to
improve employability while at the same time avoiding
making the jobs created preferable over other labour
market ‘real’ jobs. Indeed, the 1980s have left a British
legacy of such schemes being viewed very poorly by
employers as the last resort of the most hopeless cases.
Looking abroad, the experience from foreign schemes
seems to be that short-term employment in itself is often
not enough – schemes work best when they meet a
number of needs besides simple work experience.
Training during employment – the provision of
marketable hard skills and qualifications as well as soft
skills – is a common development. The New York City
Parks Department, faced with a rigid and simple model of
workfare, produced its own employment and training
programme. PACT (Parks Career Training Program)
adapted and augmented 800 WEP (workfare) placements
to provide specific training programmes based on
departmental work tasks. These are not just horticultural
based but involve security, custodial, clerical and
handyman courses. One popular element of PACT is the
training to drive both regular and commercial vehicles.
On-the-job training is organised by placing trainees in a
supervised work team or by giving them individual
placements (internships) alongside a Parks Department
tradesman. Wherever there is a recognisable, vocationally
relevant qualification, such as first aid, boiler maintenance
and security certificates, these are awarded. In addition,
access to Board of Education sponsored high school
diploma classes – General Equivalency Diploma (GED) –
is provided. PACT training lasts typically six months but,
if participants are seen as ‘job ready’ before that point,
then they are encouraged to go to interviews. After
successful job-placement, PACT counsellors provide 30-,
60- and 90-day follow up. While on PACT, participants
also have access to counselling to assist with both social
and work-related problems.
The German and Dutch social assistance employment
programmes have also grown in the quality and extent of
training and post-employment provision. For instance, in
Hamburg, a private not-for-profit company, HAB, offers
Sozialhilfe claimants training and employment at union-
agreed rates of pay in a variety of sub-enterprises run
under its umbrella. The employment is in real commercial
enterprises that provide services or make things and sell
them in the market place. However, usually, such sub-
enterprises are subsidised because they could not
commercially compete without a subsidy. They include
metalwork (making fittings for a Dutch shipbuilding
firm), furniture making and restoration, textiles, painting
and decorating, and restaurant and catering services. The
latest HAB project is a small hotel of 17 rooms situated at
Hamburg’s Olympic swimming pool. Aquasport, as the
hotel is called, has been set up because there was nowhere
near the pool to stay during competitions or training
sessions. The need for the hotel at the pool was
established by the City of Hamburg’s sports
administration but they were unable to find a private
provider willing to set it up. They approached HAB and
provided the capital funds subsidised by the City, but the
operation of the hotel is on a commercial basis. The hotel
is also a welfare to work site run by HAB. Thirty-one ex-
Sozialhilfe claimants on placement work shifts there under
a professional management trained in hotel and catering
skills.
The first eight weeks of all HAB placements are devoted
to training before the job placement starts. However, there
is a 20 per cent allocation of time for training throughout
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the placement, and training continues through courses run
by outside providers. Caseworkers at HAB assist with
health, family and other problems, provide counselling
and help broker access to other services in the City. There
is also a legal worker to deal with participants’ debts –
around one million DM in total from all the participants.
When the participant leaves, they are seen as being job
ready and HAB has recently employed three active job
development workers to give in-depth help to leavers
moving into work.
There is a thus a move away from ‘simple’ provision of
jobs only in employment policy towards more mixed
packages of jobs plus training, plus advice and plus job
brokering. These moves accompany an increasing
targeting of job creation. In the Netherlands, the first two
waves of semi-permanent job creation (the so-called
Melkert jobs) have now been joined by temporary
positions which are increasingly geared towards the
private job market. In Germany, the social insurance
schemes (ABMs) are adapting to take on the more
disadvantaged unemployed – particularly those with poor
health or disabilities – and more work is being done to
improve throughflow. In France, the model has moved
less towards mixed provision and remains highly
compartmentalised, with specific programmes for specific
target groups who are difficult to package together.
Innovation in France is largely in schemes where
particular policy providers take the effort to join things
up. One example is some social landlords who are not
only putting together job packages for Emploi Jeunes
schemes on problem estates but are also active in ensuring
that training and employment programmes are integrated
into everyday building and management.
In-work support
A further element in the model of integrated packages is
the role of in-work support. In general, the US debate is
increasingly concerned about income progression and
sustainability in work as more leave welfare but the
majority of leavers are seen not to be leaving poverty. The
problem for US policy is that successful job retention and
progression schemes have not been easily transferable.
What seemed to work quite well in Chicago would not
replicate elsewhere. The more fundamental problems for
US policy may well link back to structural problems of a
diversionary work-first approach, the delivery of in-work
programmes and high marginal tax rates and their
combination with the low-paid end of the US labour
markets. Sustainable, consistent work with income
progression – fewer gaps and better earnings – is a policy
aim that should be equally integrated in the design of
welfare to work approaches and not added on at the end in
an attempt to solve problems in part caused by the original
design. Some US providers place great emphasis on job
placement quality and post-placement support. This is
important for those with existing work records where a
period of frictional unemployment and a move to a better
job could be preferable to being forced to take a similar or
worse job. How such a strategy fits into rigid and strict
work first programmes is not exactly clear from the US
evidence because many of the gains to earnings and lower
poverty rates from experimental evidence have been
obtained by removing or reducing frictional entitlement of
such claimants.
Providing job retention and income progression for the
hardest to serve, for instance those with no work
experience whatsoever for whom getting and keeping any
job is an important first step, is more difficult. The
experience of the US STRIVE programme run by the East
Harlem Employment Project is a good example of
combining assistance in work with getting low entry-level
jobs. STRIVE is an open-access, not-for-profit service
that focuses on soft skill development and interview and
job search techniques. However, STRIVE’s job
development staff assist in developing contacts with
employers, and help participants to find employment that
offers benefits, skills development and opportunities for
advancement. But all of STRIVE’s graduates must
successfully apply for and obtain their own positions. No
job is viewed initially as ‘dead end’, because participants’
previous work records often mean that they need job
experience in order to begin or restart a work history as
well as a pathway for advancement. After placement,
however, STRIVE guarantees to continue to work with
clients to upgrade their employment. For the first two
years, it is STRIVE’s responsibility to contact the client
and check how things are every quarter. After two years,
graduates can request services at any point in their
lifetime on their own initiative. STRIVE now supplements
this service with specific graduate-access programmes to
educational and hard-skill training programmes.
These suggestions and examples of mixed packages and
approaches show the need to increase the diversity and
flexibility of policy for harder-to-serve claimants. The
advantages of successful early identification of
employment barriers, as in the US and Dutch profiling
approaches, are that it can reduce time out of work if the
correct package can be implemented early. There is no
reason why such packages cannot be identified and co-
ordinated by caseworkers working as personal advisors in
Britain. The main problem in Britain is that organisations
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offering such packages are only slowly emerging on a
scale that could provide reasonable coverage. The benefits
of having single organisations providing packages are that
it ensures continuity for the claimant – they could be
trained, placed in work and given post-employment
services by the same organisation or caseworker.
Lessons from Chapter 4
• The results of US welfare reform require careful and
critical appraisal. British policy makers should not be
taken in by headlines and rhetoric. The high-profile
gainers – the single moms on welfare who go to work
at Salomon Barclay and get to go to the White House
as an icon of welfare reform – are a small part of the
story.
• It is true that many US claimants have left welfare
and many of them are working, but, while 62 to 75
per cent work at some point in the first 12 months
after leaving welfare, only 36 per cent are in
employment 12 months after they have left, 20 per
cent of leavers are not in work and have no evidence
of income, and 30 per cent return to welfare.
• Most States’ studies of welfare leavers show that the
majority of leavers are either financially the same or
worse off than they were when they were on welfare.
Taking an American State with very high reductions
in welfare caseload, Wisconsin, only one-third of
welfare leavers are above the poverty level.
• The effects of US welfare to work programmes have
made the poorest quintile of lone mothers lose in real
income terms and the majority of this lost income is
loss of means-tested benefits. While child poverty
rates have declined from 16 to 14 per cent overall in
the US, the net per capita poverty gap for children
has grown in real terms by 9 per cent since welfare
reform.
• An integrated approach to helping the hardest to serve
should include individual profiling of needs. There is
also a fundamental unfairness in encouraging those
with substantial barriers to work to fail at job search
and thus become less motivated before giving them
help that was foreseeable.
• Assessment of individual needs and potential has
been shown to work in private intermediaries who
rely on good-quality, long-lasting job placements to
make money. Their experience was that in-depth
assessment of psychosocial stability, as well as the
standard assessments of human capital and job
readiness, were crucial to their potential success at
work and not just their work experience, skills,
welfare history and verbal proficiency. Bureaucratic
assessments of employability and job readiness rarely
establish a trusting relationship with the claimant and
focus too much on someone’s wage potential rather
than on whether they can succeed in work.
• A simpler version of profiling for lone parents would
actually ensure the child-care issue is settled before
subsequently providing employment and training
services, as in the French, Dutch and German
approaches.
• Combining training in an employment approach
means that training is accompanied by the experience
of being in a work environment, emphasising the
need for punctuality and good personal presentation
and dress. It also allows both the employer and
employee to draw down their relevant subsidies and
enables these subsidies to be smoothed on subsequent
move into a real job.
• The US debate is increasingly concerned about
income progression and sustainable work. Successful
job retention and progression schemes have not been
easily transferable. More fundamental problems for
US policy may well link back to structural problems
of policy design. Sustainable, consistent work with
income progression – fewer gaps and better earnings
– is a policy aim that should be equally integrated in
the design of welfare to work approaches and not
added on at the end in an attempt to solve problems in
part caused by the original design.
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One lesson from all four countries is that there is no one
programme or approach that can be easily imported ‘off
the peg’. Chapter 1 of this report has demonstrated how
far national programmes reflect and reinforce assumptions
about selection of the target group. Britain has, to its
credit, begun to challenge its own organisational
assumptions and to extend services to a wider group than
just the unemployed. As we move towards more equality
of treatment for lone parents and disabled people, how do
we move towards real equality of opportunity? If we are
to learn from abroad, it is not just a matter of learning
about techniques but also learning about the policy
context that underlies those techniques – understanding
about programme selection and pre-selection as well as
the overarching policy environment.
A second but related lesson comes from international
evidence of get-tough policy. Getting tougher – i.e.
making programmes mandatory or reducing entitlement –
is not a sure way of creating success. Providing more
assistance in education, training and work transition may
require an element of compulsion in some instances,
especially where voluntary access promotes cream
skimming and providers are not compelled to help those
most in need. But getting tough just for the sake of it – for
populist appeal or for partisan one-upmanship carries
great dangers. The American experience of withdrawing
welfare or of implementing a strong anti-entitlement
approach suggests that there are limits to implementing
the anti-welfare pro-work rhetoric and tough rules. While
it is demonstrable that entitlement to welfare may affect
employment rates and unemployment duration, there is
also much evidence to show that making welfare
disappear or introducing very tough rules does not solve
the problem of unemployment. The evidence from
Michigan and from current work-first reforms shows how
mixed the results can be. A British government that is
concerned with child poverty and social exclusion, and
that wants to ensure neighbourhood renewal, to provide
access to lifetime learning and to bring illegal
employment under control is gradually seeing that US
experience does not give a good template for these aims.
Neither do other countries where there is no, or limited,
entitlement to benefits – for instance, French youth who
have the combination of no entitlement to welfare, high
levels of unemployment and a range of programmes that
tend to cycle them in and out of temporary contracts
rather than provide sustained employment.
These first two lessons suggest that simplistic solutions –
whether rhetorical or procedural – rarely produce the
opportunity to learn constructive lessons. Welfare to work
programmes are a complex set of policy interventions
which require careful balancing of approaches and
methods, and which must take into account the micro- and
macro-circumstances of their recipients. There are two
decisions that seem fundamental. The first is about
selection priorities and the second is about transition aims.
Put more simply, the questions are who are we going to
help first and most, and, second, where do we want them
to end up?
Selection priorities have underpinned much of the
description and analysis in this report. The British New
Deals still disproportionately focus on the unemployed,
and more so on the young, to the extent that three-quarters
of the spending goes on 7 per cent of the target
population. But, if we are to progress from the decisions
made in 1997, it is time to start thinking about more
equality of treatment across the claimant groups. For
instance, if unemployment in youth is such a scarring
lifetime event, then programmes for 18 to 24-year-old
lone parents and people with disabilities need to be greatly
expanded to meet the additional barriers that these
claimants face. The inconsistency between the age and
claimant group criteria in the British programmes is stark
and difficult to justify if we are moving to a commonly
administered group catered for by a single agency.
When we compare our approach to that of the Dutch, we
find they invest the most in social and work rehabilitation
for those with the greatest distance from the labour
market. US practice is moving to cope with the reality of
long-term, hard-to-serve populations who are increasingly
seen as legitimate recipients of cash help and services.
German work reintegration programmes are now being
refocused on the unemployed with long-term illness and
other barriers to work. On the other hand, it is true that
both the Germans and the French spend huge efforts and
sums on youth programmes – but, for both countries,
there is little or no claimant-based benefit bill behind this
approach. Few young people either claim or are entitled.
Investment in youth and remedying the effects of poor
schooling and childhood poverty in early adulthood are
essential policy aims but should not swallow up funds for
the reintegration of long-term unemployed and inactive
people.
5␣ ␣ Conclusions and lessons for Britain
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The second main assumption is about destination
priorities. This means having a clear sense of where
people can be relative to what resources and barriers they
have. It also implies having an appreciation of their
history as well as their potential (for instance, see the
description of the Bootstrap Project in Evans, 2001).
Personal history – especially a working record – has
dwindled in importance as we have moved away from a
contributory social insurance system. When it comes to
reskilling or to rehabilitation for sickness and disability,
the continental social insurance programmes have specific
funds for, and financial interest in, such services and
claimants have a right to obtain them if they fit the
circumstances. Our system currently does not give much,
if any, recognition of the length of employment. Only
length of unemployment currently gives real rights to
retraining programmes, not the length and quality of
previous employment.
The Employment Service can see the same person many
times and return them into work on each occasion but will
have little interest in their career. But recognition of
periods in work, in training or of looking after children in
the home is how a contributory system calculates its
rewards. We seem to have forgotten this and only think of
making work pay by rewarding the step change – making
real income higher in work at the point of transition into
work – rather than building on work to ensure that more
benefits accrue and can be called upon when needed.
British emphasis on means-testing and the step-change
transition into work helps to frustrate a more dynamic
approach. As policies for lifetime learning and individual
learning accounts are being implemented, there is a
greater need to think about how we deliver programmes
and benefits over time. The length of employment on poor
wages could act as a trigger to training grants that are
aimed at increasing earnings capacity. For instance, a
number of repeated claims for in-work benefits could
trigger a training-based response. Credits towards lifetime
learning could be given disproportionately to those with a
history of unemployment or low wages. There is currently
a danger that the combination of tax credit and the
minimum wage will create new plateaus in employment
profiles – of people in work, with incomes greater than
they would have out of work but with low skills and little
opportunity to make things better. If they work harder, the
high marginal tax rates mean they will not be a lot better
off and they will see their children less often. The policy
choice is either to continue to pay in-work benefits
(welfare of sorts) and/or to help them upskill. The second
choice could mean adding more training opportunities –
either in work or out of work.
Similarly, there is no reason why those returning to
benefit should be treated in the same way as those who are
making their first claim. A repeated spell of
unemployment could signal early access to programmes
that would otherwise require a specified duration on
benefit. For instance, why should a claimant have to wait
for a period to access work-based training for adults on
their second or third spell of unemployment? They have
probably shown that they can get and hold a job, and the
choice is whether to turn them around swiftly back into a
similar job or give them access to human capital
improvement before re-entering work and hopefully a
better job. The result of this sort of targeting may actually
lead to longer periods of benefits and training than would
have been the case at that instance of unemployment but
would hopefully reduce future incidence/durations of
unemployment. Such a dynamic approach based on
assessment of individual capacities and barriers to work
could build in reinforcement of training trajectories – so
that having been unemployed or a claimant of benefits
increased access to lifetime learning resources. The
lessons from abroad that support dynamic approaches are
few and tend to be based only on the better-off, socially
insured populations – for instance, the retraining and
requalification programmes in German social insurance. If
Britain were to implement a dynamic needs-based
programme, then it would be the focus of much
international interest.
The ONE service is already allowing the non-unemployed
to have access to ES programmes to train before looking
for jobs and it is also allowing access to training earlier
than ES duration limits for the unemployed. The extent to
which increased access to services and the improved
efficiency in the claiming process obtained by ONE are
resulting in better outflows of claimants is not yet
determined. One of the most worrying features of how the
initiative will be taken forward in the amalgamation of ES
and BA is the setting of new operational incentives. If
they are based too strictly on a point-in-time approach,
they could turn ONE into a US-style, quick turnaround
and diversion-based approach. This is unlikely with the
present Government, which is concerned with quality
outcomes and with preventing social exclusion, but not
impossible – especially when there is strong pressure to
reduce claimant populations.
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The downgrading of a strong institutional ‘pro-welfare’
role by making all benefits relate to work in a single
work-focused institution is potentially worrying for
several reasons. There has to be a counterbalance against
the work focus to ensure quality outcomes for those who
cannot foreseeably work. Delivering the ‘security for
those who cannot’ should be seen as equally important as
helping those who can work into work. This is a matter
not only of benefit levels but also of access to and co-
ordination of services. Since 1948, British benefits have
not had a social work or casework approach; cash was
divorced from care. But now a casework approach is
advocated for those who are moving into work – at
present performed by personal advisors. These workers
are trained to give advice, to identify barriers and
opportunities to work, to listen and assist claimants, and
to set up services that respond to needs. They have proven
to be the most consistently popular and effective measure
across all of the New Deals, but this success should be
seen in the light of what went before and the groups they
are serving. It is not clear that personal advisors, as
currently trained and specified, will meet a far wider
range of needs when it comes to dealing with those with
significant barriers to work than can be solved by
information giving. But it is also inconsistent that there is
no equivalent to personal advisors for those who have no
foreseeable work trajectory. If a single organisation is to
deliver equality of opportunity to all working-age adults,
it should have an interest in ensuring that the right policy
packages are available to those who can and cannot work.
Too great a preoccupation with a ‘work focus’ will
otherwise merely hand out cash alone to those who are at
highest risk of social isolation and exclusion.
The policy history of social security has no background of
helping the hard to serve beyond cash payment and the
ES’s history has been based on servicing a pre-selected
group who were also not hard to serve. There is thus a
worry that such structural organisational change will not
see service-rich provision for welfare to work as a priority
other than for the under-25s. The current set of
programmes designed for the unemployed and expanded a
little for lone parents and others will be rolled out across
the whole claimant population. It is difficult to see how
the distribution of resources, so prominently skewed to
the easiest to serve at present, can be reallocated other
than by a ‘wait and see’ policy (this means that, as
unemployment levels fall, the harder to serve will
eventually get nearer to the front of the queue, but
presumably still some way behind the continued demands
of the frictionally unemployed). While this approach may
make sense in economic terms as an efficient rationing of
current resources, it cannot also carry the label of equal
opportunity.
A complementary approach of investing more resources in
building experience and programmes of wider and more
mixed provision should be considered, and this report has
given examples of programmes that have been applied
elsewhere earlier in this chapter and in Chapters 2 and 3.
How much of this investment should be in the new
combined agency and how much outside? Britain is
already far behind in the use of intermediaries and is
trying to catch up. It is worth remembering that many of
the most successful US intermediaries sprang from
programmes that were set up in the mid-1970s –
especially the Supported Work Programme, which
provided a cohort of expertise that, for instance, heads
STRIVE, America Works, Wildcat and others in New
York today. The nearest equivalents in community-based
organisations in Britain are the projects set up under local
urban regeneration funds, or under the European Social
Fund. However, the policy lines of communication and
funding between the centre and these groups are not
consistent or clear. The ideological/theoretical divide over
the issue of the ‘Jobs Gap’ between central supply-siders
and local demand-siders reads like a Pinter play – two
overlapping monologues, one intoning that there are jobs
created everywhere and the other that there are not enough
to go round. Both the Social Exclusion Unit and the
Parliamentary Select Committee on Education and
Employment have decided that both are true and that local
employment creation though ILMs is a real option that
should be expanded (House of Commons Committee for
Education and Employment, 2000; SEU Policy Action
Team on Jobs, 2000). Transitional employment
programmes based on real work in temporary positions
providing public goods are a potential source of
intermediaries that require investment and nurturing with
clear policy guidance and funding structures. Measuring
their performance is, however, not limited to their welfare
to work function but should also include the services they
provide. If these are measured and costed, then the overall
net costs of such programmes reduce and their outputs are
recognised and valued.
We are at a time when the past 25 years of under-
investment in public goods is becoming very apparent.
The appalling state of public transport, the under-supply
of affordable child care, the state of public open spaces
(House of Commons Environment, Transport and
Regional Affairs Committee, 1999) and the filth of city
streets all represent not only a lack of capital investment
but also a move away from jobs. Popular opinion
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recognises these failures and also backs government
provision of employment for the ‘unemployed’ (Hills and
Lelkes, 1999). Joined-up government should seize on the
examples of good employment-based intermediaries
(Marshall and Macfarlane, 2000) and follow them up.
What is needed is an institutional basis at the centre of
policy making that brings together a new commitment to
improving public goods and simultaneously providing
high-quality, transitional community employment and
training.
Lastly, it is worth returning to the word ‘Welfare’ that
started this report. Welfare can have caring, neutral or
damning meanings and that is its attraction to many. But
there are lessons for us in all three meanings. For instance,
Britain tends to overplay the negative. Americans and
Europeans are amazed to hear their social insurance
programmes and non-contributory disability benefits
labelled ‘welfare’ as we do because that damns them as
undeserving programmes. The British social security
system has been accused of failing and every adult
claimant under 60 is the subject of a silent accusation:
‘Could you be working instead of claiming benefits?’ But
this implies an equally silent rejoinder on Government:
‘What are you doing to assist in expanding my
opportunities to work?’ Finding out the fair and rational
answers to such questions takes time, is difficult and
expensive to do, and contingent on the state of the general
economy. Conversely, pointing the finger is the laziest and
easiest thing to do.
Turning to the caring use of the term, then Britain can be
proud that its policy is concerned about poverty and about
the quality of life for children and adults, both in work
and on benefits. The evaluations of the British New Deals
give many examples of how claimants welcomed being
appreciated and listened to, and having their barriers and
capacities recognised. We are investing more help, more
services to ensure that individual welfare is increased.
This is not the dominant approach in the USA, where the
current paradigm either thinks that helping hurts or that
hurting helps. As the evidence of the relative size of hurt
and help is becoming clearer from the USA, it shows us
that a commitment to welfare as a positive term is an
essential element to preventing poverty and social exclusion.
A neutral view of welfare recognises the legitimacy of a
system that provides a minimum standard of living in and
out of work. Everyone agrees that there are some who are
not required to work. These are the parents of infants, the
carers of disabled people and some disabled people
themselves. These as well as the frictionally unemployed
have legitimate claims for support from the community.
For those who can work, then the challenge is to provide a
system that recognises and responds to need and that is
successful in building employability and promoting
employment: ‘welfare to work’ it may be called but it is
part of a wider organisation of opportunity.
Summary of conclusions
• One lesson from all four countries is that there is no
one programme or approach that can be easily
imported ‘off the peg’.
• Britain is challenging its own organisational
assumptions and extending services to a wider group
than just the unemployed. As we move towards more
equality of treatment for lone parents and disabled
people, how do we move towards real equality of
opportunity? But, if we are to progress from the
decisions made in 1997, it is time to start thinking about
more equality of treatment across the claimant groups.
• When we compare our approach to that of the Dutch,
then they invest the most in social and work
rehabilitation on those with the greatest distance from
the labour market. US practice is moving to cope with
the reality of long-term, hard-to-serve populations
who are increasingly seen as legitimate recipients of
cash help and services. German work reintegration
programmes are now being refocused on the
unemployed with long-term illness and other barriers
to work.
• Welfare to work policy should not fixate on a single
transition at a given point of time. It should become
more dynamic in outlook.
• Policy should encourage practitioners to have a clear
sense of where people can be relative to what
resources and barriers they have. This implies having
an appreciation of their history as well as their
potential. Our system currently does not give much, if
any, recognition of the length and quality of
employment. Only length of unemployment currently
gives real rights to retraining programmes.
• Repeated unemployment should not be treated as
separate individual events. The Employment Service
can see the same person many times and return them
into work on each occasion but will have little
interest in their career. We seem to think of making
work pay only by rewarding the step change –
making real income higher in work at the point of
transition into work. Work history is important to
ensure that more benefits can be called upon when
needed at later times – either in work or when next on
welfare.
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• Delivering in-work benefits should consider the need
for training and up-skilling rather than continue to
pay ‘passive’ benefits for low pay. For instance, a
number of repeated claims for in-work benefits could
trigger a training-based response. Credits towards
lifetime learning could be given disproportionately to
those with a history of unemployment or low wages.
• The most worrying feature of the amalgamation of ES
and BA is the setting of new operational incentives. If
they are based too strictly on simple turnaround and
in-work targets, they could turn ONE into a US-style,
diversion-based approach.
• Work is also about investment in public goods. The
appalling state of public transport, the under-supply
of affordable child care, the state of public open
spaces and the filth of city streets all represent not
only a lack of capital investment but also a move
away from jobs. Employment-based welfare to work
schemes can and should play a role in such
reinvestment.
• Ease back on the rhetoric – the US experience
suggests that demonising ‘welfare’ and the people
who claim it does not help good quality policy
making. Britain is investing more in help and more in
services to ensure that individual welfare is increased.
This is not the dominant approach in the USA, where
the current paradigm either thinks that helping hurts
or that hurting helps. A commitment to welfare as a
positive term is an essential element to prevent
poverty and social exclusion. The challenge is to
provide a system that recognises and responds to need
and that is successful in building employability and
promoting employment: ‘welfare to work’ it may be
called but it is part of a wider organisation of
opportunity.
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